Design and implementation of a content filtering firewall by Du, Rongbo
University of Wollongong 
Research Online 
University of Wollongong Thesis Collection 
1954-2016 University of Wollongong Thesis Collections 
2002 
Design and implementation of a content filtering firewall 
Rongbo Du 
University of Wollongong, rongbo@uow.edu.au 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ro.uow.edu.au/theses 
University of Wollongong 
Copyright Warning 
You may print or download ONE copy of this document for the purpose of your own research or study. The University 
does not authorise you to copy, communicate or otherwise make available electronically to any other person any 
copyright material contained on this site. 
You are reminded of the following: This work is copyright. Apart from any use permitted under the Copyright Act 
1968, no part of this work may be reproduced by any process, nor may any other exclusive right be exercised, 
without the permission of the author. Copyright owners are entitled to take legal action against persons who infringe 
their copyright. A reproduction of material that is protected by copyright may be a copyright infringement. A court 
may impose penalties and award damages in relation to offences and infringements relating to copyright material. 
Higher penalties may apply, and higher damages may be awarded, for offences and infringements involving the 
conversion of material into digital or electronic form. 
Unless otherwise indicated, the views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not necessarily 
represent the views of the University of Wollongong. 
Recommended Citation 
Du, Rongbo, Design and implementation of a content filtering firewall, Master of Computer Science 
(Hons.) thesis, School of Information Technology and Computer Science, University of Wollongong, 2002. 
https://ro.uow.edu.au/theses/2311 
Research Online is the open access institutional repository for the University of Wollongong. For further information 
contact the UOW Library: research-pubs@uow.edu.au 
Design and Implementation of A Content Filtering 
Firewall 
A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the 
requirements for the award of the degree 
Master of Computer Science (Honours) 
from 
UNIVERSITY OF WOLLONGONG 
by 
Rongbo Du 
School of Information Technology and Computer Science 
2002 
Acknowledgement 
I am grateful to my principal supervisor Professor Rei Safavi-Naini and co-supervisor 
Dr. Willy Susilo for their constant guidance and support. 
Abstract 
Firewall is a component or a set of components that restricts access between a 
protected network and the Internet, or between two networks. A traditional firewall 
tries to protect the internal network from outside threats by permitting or forbidding 
network connections between the external network and the intemal network. The rules 
used by the firewall to determine whether a connection should be permitted or not are 
usually based on the connection type, source address or destination address of the 
connection, or user authentication, and not on the actual content of the network traffic. 
Content filtering is to monitor and analyse data in order to filter specific content that is 
forbidden by an organisation's policy. Previous content filtering approaches include: 
use blacklists and whitelists to keep lists of sites that should be blocked or allowed, 
search the content for keywords that frequently appear in undesired sites and block the 
content if such keywords are found, or utilise rating systems that provide rating of 
sites. Most previous Internet content filtering programs reside and run on the end 
users' machines, and not on a central point of the network such as firewall. Therefore, 
such content filtering could be circumvented or disabled by dishonest end users. In 
addition to that, maintaining or updating of such programs need to be done for each 
end user's terminal machines individually. 
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate, propose and experiment how to combine 
the content filtering and firewall together, in order to solve problems that cannot be 
solved either by content filtering or by firewall individually. 
We propose a method of adding content filtering functionality to the firewall and 
describe its implementation. We also propose and implement an advanced content 
filtering method based on text categorisation techniques to replace the basic keyword-
matching filtering method. We discuss using content filtering firewall to prevent 
computer virus propagation through the Internet. Then we propose and describe the 
implementation of a new attack using encryption to get around the content filtering 
firewall, hence showing the difficulty the content filtering firewall encounters when 
end-to-end encryption for network traffic is used. 
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Chapter 1 
Overview of the Thesis 
This chapter firstly introduces the objectives of this research, and then briefly 
describes the outhne of the thesis. 
1.1 Objectives 
We propose and implement a content filtering firewall. The objectives of this thesis are 
as follows: 
• To evaluate current content filtering methods and firewalls, and propose how 
to combine content filtering and firewall together. 
• Investigate problems with the basic keyword-matching method used in 
content filtering and propose an advanced content filtering method. 
• Analyse and experiment possible attacks on the content filtering firewall. 
1.2 OutUne 
Chapter 2 describes the appHcation of content filtering, introduces previous work and 
some unsolved problems in this field. Chapter 3 introduces firewall and some 
limitations of the traditional model. Chapter 4 firstly compares filtering at the end 
users' terminal machines, and filtering at a central firewall, and then describes the 
design of a content filtering firewall. Finally, legal and ethical issues of content 
filtering are discussed. Chapter 5 proposes and implements an advanced content 
filtering method based on text categorisation techniques to replace the basic keyword-
matching filtering method. Chapter 6 discusses how to use content filtering firewall to 
prevent computer virus propagation through the Litemet. Chapter 7 proposes and 
describes the implementation of an attack using encryption to get around the content 
fihering firewall, hence showing the difficulty that content filtering firewall encounters 
when end-to-end encryption for network traffic is used. Based on the architecture 
proposed in Chapter 4, a content filtering firewall is implemented that uses the firewall 
toolkit (FWTK). Chapter 8 gives details of the implementation. Chapter 9 draws some 
conclusions about the design of content filtering firewall and introduces possible future 
work in the area of content filtering firewall. 
Details of the experimental network used in the implementation are in Appendix A. 
Details of the testing of the content filtering firewall are in Appendix B. Appendix C 
includes the source codes of the implementation of the proposed advanced content 
filtering method in Chapter 5. Error! Reference source not found, includes the 
source codes of the implementation of the Naïve Bayes categorisation method used in 
Chapter 5. Error! Reference source not found, includes the source codes of the 
implementation of the K-Nearest Neighbour categorisation method used in Chapter 5. 
Error! Reference source not found, includes the source codes of the implementation 
of the Decision Tree categorisation method used in Chapter 5. Appendix D includes 
the source codes of the implementation of the proposed attack on content filtering 
firewall in Chapter 8. 
Chapter 2 
Introduction to Content Filtering 
This chapter describes the apphcations of content filtering, introduces previous works 
and some unsolved problems in this field. 
2.1 Needs for Content Filtering 
Content filtering is to monitor and analyse data in order to filter specific content that is 
forbidden by the organisation's policy. There are a number of reasons why content 
filtering is needed: 
• To prevent inappropriate contents. 
While the Internet can provide people with valuable information, it could also 
be hosts for pornographic, violent or other inappropriate contents. Content 
filtering can be used to prevent people from accessing such inappropriate 
contents. In some cases, it is compulsory to filter such inappropriate contents. 
The America's Children's Internet Protection Act requires public schools and 
libraries that receive federal funds to install content filtering programs for 
Internet access [24]. 
• To prevent computer viruses or mahcious codes. 
Computer virus is a computer program that can infect other computer programs 
by modifying them in such a way as to include a (possibly evolved) copy of 
itself [6]. In recent years, with the wide spread of the Intemet, the Internet has 
replaced floppy disks as the primary media for computer viruses propagation. 
Computer viruses or malicious codes could come into the internal network via 
E-mail attachments, or be downloaded by inexperienced users via HTTP or 
FTP protocol. 
To prevent employees' misuse of the network. 
During office hours, some employees might waste time on browsing leisure 
Web sites, downloading MP3 or other types of streaming video/audio files, 
chatting with Mends, etc. Such misuses of the network not only decrease 
productivity but also impose unnecessary load on the traffic of the entire 
network, impeding other users' legitimate activities. In some cases such as 
downloading illegal music files or software programs, these might be legal 
implications not only for the user, but also for his or her organisation since the 
network devices is used for illegal downloading. 
To prevent sensitive or classified documents from being disclosed without 
being authorised. 
Users could intentionally send out sensitive or classified documents to the 
external network without being authorised. Besides that, malicious programs 
such as computer viruses could also unintentionally disclose sensitive or 
classified documents. For example, if the Sircam virus infects a computer, the 
virus searches the hard drive for Microsoft Word, Excel and Zip documents. 
Then the virus randomly chooses one of the documents found and sends the 
document chosen as email attachment to a number of randomly chosen email 
addresses from the address book. Once sensitive or classified documents are 
sent out, the consequences could be serious because there are no means to 
retract them. 
2.2 Previous Works on Content Filtering and Their 
Limitations 
This section briefly introduces previous approaches used in content filtering and their 
limitations. Previous approaches include the following. 
2.2.1 Blacklists and Whitelists 
Blacklists are lists of all sites that should be blocked by the filtering program. 
Whitelists are Usts of all sites that should be allowed. They are usually composed by 
manually examining of each Web page to decide whether or not the page is within 
certain undesired categories, such as "Full Nudity," "Music," "Stock Market," etc. Sites 
can also be included to the blacklists because their domain name contains certain 
keywords like "sex", "xxx", etc. For example, if www.nasdaq.com is classified into the 
category of "Stock Market" and is recorded in the blacklist, the filtering system will 
deny users' request to access www.nasdaq.com. 
The problem with this method is that because numerous new sites continue to emerge 
everyday and the content of sites could change overtime, it is very hard to keep the 
lists complete and up-to-date. 
2.2.2 Keyword Blocking 
Some content filtering programs consider a Web page to be undesired if the page 
contains certain words in a keyword list. The keyword list contains selected words that 
frequently appear in undesired sites. 
The problem with keyword blocking method is that since the meanings of some 
keywords depend on the context, the filtering system may wrongly block Web pages 
that should not have been blocked. For example, sites about breast cancer research 
could be blocked just because their pages contain a number of the keyword "breast" 
that could exist in the undesired "pornography category" keyword list. 
Another problem with keyword blocking is that keywords in the undesired pages could 
be misspelled intentionally or unintentionally, which may cause the undesired pages 
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pass through the filtering system without being found. For example, malicious sites 
that want to get around the content filtering can intentionally omit or modify some 
letters in the keywords, such as modify "pornographic" to "pomogaphic". Such minor 
omittances or modifications do not cause much misunderstanding for interested 
audience, but do impose significant difficulties on the filtering programs trying to find 
the original keywords. 
2.2.3 Rating Systems 
Some content filtering programs utilise rating of sites. Systems such as PICS (Platform 
for Internet Content Selection) [30] developed by the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology's World Wide Web Consortium produce rating for sites. The PICS 
specification enables labels (metadata) to be associated with Internet content. The 
PICS standard describes two approaches to the rating of sites: 
• Self-Rating: Web site pubUshers can evaluate their own content and put PICS 
rating information directly into the Web pages they create or distribute. 
• Third-Party Ratings: Independent third parties can use PICS ratings systems to 
evaluate Web sites and publish their own results that could be used by other 
users for content filtering purpose. 
The problem with rating systems is that: 
• Rating is not always available. Since rating for Web pages is not compulsory, 
the content filtering systems still need to use other filtering approaches for 
those Web pages without ratings. 
• Even if available, the ratings are not always rehable or accurate, especially in 
the case of self-rating. Some malicious sites may intentionally provide false 
ratings for their Web pages in order to get around the content filtering system. 
2.3 Current Content Filtering Software 
Current content filtering programs include Cyber Patrol from Microsystems Software 
[26], SurfWatch from SurfWatch Software [32], MIMEsweeper from Baltimore 
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Technologies [29], etc. 
However, few of such filtering programs are built directly into firewall. Most of them 
are individual applications or plug-in applications that reside on the end users' terminal 
machines. Plug-in applications are third-party programs that are installed as part of the 
Internet browsers and used for presenting the Web pages. Therefore, such content 
filtering programs have the following problems: 
• Dishonest users could circumvent the content filtering programs. For example, 
even though a content filtering plug-in program has been installed for the 
Microsoft Internet Explorer browser in order to prevent the users from 
browsing leisure sites, users can install the Opera Internet browser or any other 
Internet browsers and use such browser instead to browse leisure sites. 
• In those cases where the users own administrator level rights for their own 
machines (which are very common for personal computers, especially for those 
running Microsoft Windows operating systems), dishonest users can easily 
disable the filtering by simply terminating the current running processes of 
filtering programs or by removing the filtering programs from their machines. 
• It is hard to maintain or update such content filtering programs because the 
maintaining or updating need to be done for each end user's terminal machines. 
Chapter 3 
Introduction to Firewall 
This chapter introduces firewall and some limitations of the traditional model. 
Firewall is a component or a set of components that restricts access between a 
protected network and the Internet, or between two networks. A firewall sits between 
an external network and an internal network and serves as a guard for the internal 
network. A carefully designed and deployed firewall can deny unauthenticated 
requests or requests with potential threats, while permitting authenticated requests, 
thus protecting the internal network. Firewall is effective only when direct 
communications between the internal network and the external network do not exist or 
are restricted. 
3.1 Needs for Firewall 
This section explains why firewall is needed for protecting networks. The uses of 
firewall include the folio wings. 
3.1.1 Protecting Internal Networks 
It is well known that the Internet is far from secure. There are hundreds of millions of 
people connected to the Internet. Some might maliciously try to penetrate into private 
networks to view or modify data, or even to damage the computer systems. According 
to Computer Emergency Response Team's (CERT) statistics, the number of incidents 
reported in year 2001 is 52,658, while the total number of incidents from 1988 to 2001 
is 100,369 [25]. Such threats can be roughly divided into two categories [22]. 
1. Attacks that require establishing connections between client and server, such 
as: 
• Command-channel attacks. In such attack, attacker either sends valid 
commands that do undesirable things to the server, or sends invalid 
conmiands that exploit the server's bugs in handling invalid input. 
• Data-driven attacks. Examples of such attack are computer viruses 
appended to E-mail messages, or malicious programs downloaded that 
claim to be safe. 
• False authentication of clients. In such attack, an attacker masquerades as 
one of the legitimate users to access resources. 
2. Attacks that do not need connections between client and server, including: 
• Denial of service. Such attacks try to prevent other people from accessing 
the resources by sending massive requests to the server. 
• Packet sniffing. Packet sniffing is to watch packets going through the 
network in order to find useful information such as user passwords. 
• Replay. An attacker saves past authentication information and sends it 
again in the future. 
• Data injection and modification. In such an attack, the attacker intercepts 
the traffic between the client and server, then modifies the traffic and 
dismisses the original traffic. 
• Hijacking. In a hijacking attack, an attacker takes over an open terminal or 
login session from a user who has successfully authenticated to the system. 
No matter what kind of attacks they are, the consequences of successful attacks are the 
same: they could not only lead to substantial financial losses, but could also harm the 
reputation of the victims and hence reduce their clients' confidence. 
Firewall is an important tool to reduce such threats. 
3.1.2 Enforcing Internal Security Policy 
Firewall can also be used to enforce internal security policy. Organisations usually 
have security policy controlling users' accesses to resources and communication 
services. For example, some organisations forbid outbound FTP or E-mail service for 
classified networks, in order to protect sensitive data stored in those networks. 
3.1.3 Use of Internal Firewall 
Generally firewall is deployed between the Internet and the internal network. 
However, in some situations, firewall can also guard parts of the internal network 
against its other parts. The reasons to keep one part of the internal network separate 
from other parts by internal firewall could be: 
• Different parts of the internal network may have different responsibilities, thus 
need to be protected with different degrees of security assurance. 
Some parts of the private network may be more important than the rest. 
Examples of such domains are accounting department's network where 
important financial data are stored and processed, or research & development 
networks that may have sensitive technical secrets, etc. 
• Different parts of the internal network may face different level of security 
challenges. 
Some parts of the private networks may be more subject to attacks than the 
rest, such as the demonstration networks that any outsider can freely use. 
• Different parts of the internal network may have different kinds of usages. 
For example, some parts of the private networks are used for networking 
experiments or testing that could affect other parts of the network if there is no 
protection between them. 
Internal firewall is especially useful for organisations with large private networks and 
many divisions at different physical places. 
3.2 Types of Firewalls 
This section introduces three types of firewalls: Packet-Filtering, Application-Level 
and Circuit-Level firewall. It should be noted that in practise firewalls are seldom built 
on just one of these basic types, usually they are combinations of these basic types. 
3.2.1 Packet-Filtering Firewall 
Packet-Filtering firewall works by filtering packets based on their source and/or 
destination address or ports [5]. To send information across a packet switching 
network, the information must be broken up into small pieces called packets. Each 
packet is sent separately so that multiple communications among computers can 
proceed concurrently. 
An IP packet usually contains only a few hundred bytes of payload and a set of headers 
containing information including the source address, destination address, source port 
number and destination port number. Servers for particular Internet services usually 
utilise certain port numbers; for example, port 80 is normally used for HTTP 
connections. Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) is the protocol used for 
communication between a browser and a Web server or between intermediate 
machines and Web server [7]. Therefore, according to the security policy rules, the 
Packet-Filtering firewall can block or allow certain types of connections by examining 
the source or destination port number within packet header. 
Examples of the security policy rules are: 
• Block all connections to or from certain distrusted hosts. 
• Block insecure services such as RPC (Remote Procedure Call), rlogin, rsh, etc. 
• Allow E-mail services to and from external networks, but block HTTP and FTP 
to and from external networks. 
Packet-Filtering firewall has the advantage of being fast, but it cannot provide context 
about the network traffic because it considers each packet separately and does not 
record interaction between packets. Therefore, Packet-Filtering firewall is limited and 
is usually used in conjunction with other firewall components such as bastion hosts. 
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A bastion host is a computer system that is exposed to the Internet and highly secured. 
Packet filtering rules can be set up so that packets from outside can only go to the 
bastion host, but not to any other machines within the internal network directly. 
3.2.2 Application-Level Firewall 
Another commonly used firewall is Application-Level firewall, which usually is a 
dual-homed host. A dual-homed host is a computer system that has two or more 
network interfaces. One network interface is connected to the external network and the 
other interface is connected to the internal network. Application-specific server 
programs called proxies run in the firewall host and do the forwarding of network 
traffics between the internal network and the external network. The proxy program 
takes internal users' requests for Internet services (or external requests for services in 
the internal network) and forwards them, if such requests comply with the security 
policy rules, to the actual services. 
Depending on the security policy, requests might be allowed or refused. For example, 
the FTP proxy might refuse to export files from secure networks, or it might allow 
importing files only from certified external sites. More sophisticated security policy 
might be to enforce different restrictions for different users or machines, rather than to 
enforce the same restrictions for all users or machines. 
Apphcation-Level firewall can provide better security than Packet-Filtering firewall. 
Because Application-Level firewall is application-specific, it can understand the traffic 
passing through. Apphcation-Level firewall can also provide user authentication [5]. In 
addition, to an external host, it must deal directly with the proxy server, other than talk 
directly to the internal real host. Therefore, by disclosing less information about the 
internal network to the outside, the proxy server reduces threats to the internal network 
to some extent. 
The disadvantage of Apphcation-Level firewall is that a separate proxy is required for 
each supported protocols such as FTP, Telnet, HTTP, etc. Therefore, the Apphcation-
Level firewall must understand detailed knowledge of each supported protocol. 
An example of Application-Level firewall is the Firewall Package Toolkit from 
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Trusted Mormation System that includes a number of proxy servers for protocols like 
FTP, HTTP, Telnet, rlogin, etc. 
3.2.3 Circuit-Level Firewall 
The third type of firewall is the Circuit-Level firewall that creates a circuit between the 
client and the server without interpreting the application protocol [22]. The difference 
between Circuit-Level firewall and Application-Level firewall is that Circuit-Level 
firewall does not need to understand or interpret each application protocol. The most 
popular example is the SOCKS package, which is designed to make it easy to convert 
existing client/server applications into proxy versions of those same applications. 
The advantage of Circuit-level firewall is that it can support any program using TCP, 
without the need to modify each program, because it does not need to understand the 
application protocols. 
The disadvantage of Circuit-level firewall is that it can only control connections based 
on their source and destination addresses, but cannot determine whether the traffics of 
the connections are legitimate or not. 
3.3 Firewall Architectures 
This section introduces three firewall architectures: dual-homed host architecture, 
screened host architecture and screened subnet architecture. 
3.3.1 Dual-Homed Host Architecture 
In dual-homed host firewall architecture, a dual-homed host computer sits between the 
Internet and the internal network and acts as a router between the networks, routing IP 
packets from one network to another. The dual-homed host only routes those IP 
packets that comply with the firewall's security policy. Because the Internet and the 
internal network cannot communicate directly with each other, those IP packets that 
breach the firewall's security policy cannot arrive at their destinations. 
An example of the dual-homed host architecture is shown in Figure 1. 
Firewall 
Internet t: 
B̂ ftim 
Host 
Internal 
Users 
Figure 1 Dual-Homed Host Architecture 
Dual-homed host architecture has a high level of control over the network traffics 
passing through the firewall. The disadvantage to the dual-homed host architecture is 
that the bastion host is the single point of failure. If attackers compromise the bastion 
host, nothing else can protect the internal network. 
3.3.2 Screened Host Architecture 
Screened host architecture uses an external screening router attached to the Internet 
and a bastion host attached to the internal network. The screening router routes IP 
packets coming from the Internet only to the bastion host, if the packets comply with 
the firewall's security policy. Therefore, any external machines want to connect to the 
internal network have to connect to the bastion host first. The screening router also 
routes IP packets coming from the bastion host to the Internet if the packets comply 
with the firewall's security policy. 
An example of the screened host architecture is shown in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2 Screened Host Architecture 
The disadvantage to the screened host architecture is similar to that of the dual-homed 
host architecture ~ the bastion host and the screening router both become single point 
of failure. Attackers from the Internet only need to compromise either the bastion host 
or the screening router in order to access resources in the internal network. 
3.3.3 Screened Subnet Architecture 
The screened subnet architecture has a bastion host attached to two screening routers. 
One screening router connects to the Internet while the other screening router connects 
to the internal network, as shown in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3 Screened Subnet Architecture 
The advantage to the screened host architecture is that there is no single point of 
failure. To access resources in the internal network, attackers would have to 
compromise both routers. Even if the attackers compromise the bastion host, they still 
need to compromise the interior router. 
Another more advanced screened subnet architecture is to have a perimeter network 
between the exterior router and the interior router. The perimeter network provides 
more vulnerable services and the internal network provides less vulnerable services. 
Even if the attackers break into the perimeter network via more vulnerable services, 
they still cannot break into the internal network so easily. 
3.4 Limitations of Traditional Firewall 
Although a few firewalls (such as the Check Point FireWall-1 from Check Point 
Software Technologies Ltd [23]) provide content examination functionality, most 
traditional firewalls do not examine whether the actual content of the network traffic 
comply with the organisations' poHcy or not. The firewall poHcy is not based on the 
payload of the traffic, but on information in the IP packet header such as the 
connection's type, source address or destination address of the connection, or user 
authentication, etc. 
Another problem with traditional firewalls is that they concentrate on how to protect 
the private network from external threats without monitoring the behaviours of the 
internal users. Without this monitoring, dishonest internal users may abuse the 
network. 
In the next chapter, we propose the design of a content filtering firewall that can 
enforce access control policy by analysing the contents of the network traffic passing 
through the firewall. 
Chapter 4 
Design of a Content Filtering Firewall 
This chapter firstly compares filtering at the end users' terminal machines and filtering 
at a central firewall, and then describes the design of a content filtering firewall. 
Finally, legal and ethical issues of content filtering are discussed. 
4.1 Comparisons of Filtering at Users' Terminal 
Machines and Filtering at a central Firewall 
Most previous content filtering is done at the end users' terminal machines. We 
propose a design in which the content filtering is done at the firewall that is between 
the end users' terminal machines and the extemal network. These two different 
approaches both have their advantages and disadvantages. 
4.1.1 Filtering at Users' Terminal Machines 
Content filtering at the end users' terminal machines has the following advantages: 
• Because content filtering happens at different machines, every machine 
computes content filtering for itself. Therefore, the speed of the network traffic 
will not be delayed by the computation for content filtering, making this 
approach faster than content filtering at firewall. 
• If the network traffic is encrypted and can only be decrypted at the terminal 
machines, filtering programs at terminal machines may be able to check the 
plaintext of the encrypted traffic, while filtering programs at firewall may fail 
to do so. To accomplish this, the filtering programs must be configured to do 
content filtering when the decryption finishes. 
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But the disadvantages of filtering at users' terminal machines include: 
• Dishonest users may be able to disable or circumvent content filtering. Because 
the content filtering programs reside and execute at the users' terminal 
machines, if users own administrator level rights for their terminal machines, 
dishonest users may terminate running processes of filtering programs or 
remove the filtering programs in order to disable filtering. 
• Filtering programs are hard to maintain and update. Maintaining or updating 
the content filtering programs or modification to the filtering rules need to done 
for each of the end users' terminal machines at different places. 
• It is unsuitable for terminal machines with weak computation power or limited 
storage space. Content filtering programs could take up considerable 
computation power and storage space, thus are unsuitable to be installed or 
executed in those terminals with weak computation power or limited storage 
space. 
4.1.2 Filtering at Firewall 
Content filtering at firewall has the following advantages. 
• Users cannot disable or circumvent content filtering. Firstly, the content 
filtering programs are part of the firewall and execute at the bastion host. 
Normal users do not have administrator level rights at the bastion host, 
therefore cannot disable running processes of the filtering programs or remove 
the filtering programs. Secondly, because all the network traffic between the 
end users and the external network must pass through the firewall, users have 
no means to escape the content filtering by communicating with the external 
network directly. 
• It is easy to maintain and update the filtering programs. To maintain or update 
the filtering programs and to modify the filtering rules need to done at one 
place - the bastion host where the firewall resides. 
• It is suitable for terminal machines with weak computation power or limited 
storage space. Because the content filtering is done at the firewall, there will be 
no extra requirement for the terminal machines. 
But the disadvantages of content filtering at firewall include: 
• If content filtering is computationally expensive, it will slow down the entire 
network. Because the firewall is at the central point of the network, the delay 
caused by the computation of the filtering for an internal machine's traffic 
will affect all other internal machines. 
• If the network traffic is encrypted and cannot be decrypted by the firewall, 
or more generally, if the network traffic is in a form that the firewall cannot 
correctly interpret, content filtering at the firewall will fail. This topic will be 
further discussed in Chapter 8. 
4.2 Extending A Firewall for Content Filtering 
Functionality 
To perform content filtering, the firewall cannot be only a packet-filtering firewall. It 
should be either an application-level firewall, or in general be able to understand the 
network traffic. 
The firewall access control component decides whether the connection should be 
permitted or not, according to a security policy. Then, 
• For incoming traffic, content filtering is done after the firewall's access control 
component finishes, and before the traffic is sent to the internal users. 
• For outgoing traffic, content filtering is done after the firewall's access control 
component finishes, and before the traffic is sent to external network. 
The proposed architecture for a content filtering firewall is shown in Figure 4. 
Non-text Traffic 
Terf traffic Text Content Filteiing Component 
Figure 4 Architecture of A Content Filtering Firewall 
The content filtering component accepts contents in text form, does the filtering and 
outputs the filtered result. The filtering methods used by this component can be as 
simple as a basic keyword-matching method, or other more sophisticated methods. We 
propose an advanced content filtering method to replace the basic keyword-matching 
method and discussed this method in detail in the next chapter. 
In the design, content filtering happens after the access control component finishes, 
i.e., after the firewall has decided whether the connections should be allowed to pass or 
not. Only network traffics permitted to pass through the firewall will be checked for 
undesired content. In this way, because content filtering can be avoided for those 
traffics not allowed to pass, the performance is better than to check all network traffics. 
4.2.1 Filtering for Text Files 
Most content sent over the Internet is in text form, such as HTML (HyperText Markup 
Language) files. HTML is the standard document format for Web pages [5]. A file in 
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text form can be read word by word and therefore calculating statistical values such as 
word frequency is possible. 
In our design, the content filtering components firstly read keywords from the files, 
count the word frequency, and use those frequency for determining whether the files 
should be allowed or not. Because content filtering components can read keywords 
from text files directly, no extra pre-processing work is needed. 
4.2.2 Filtering for Non-text Files 
Some files may be non-text files. For example, a file may be in Portable Document 
Format (PDF) or Microsoft Word format, or some may be in compressed forms using 
applications such as zip and gzip. Having different formats, non-text files can only be 
processed by the corresponding applications that understand the specific formats of the 
non-text files. Without knowledge about the formats of non-text files, content filtering 
components cannot read keywords from non-text files directly. Therefore some pre-
processing work is needed to convert non-text files to text files that are acceptable for 
the content filtering components. 
Therefore, content filtering follows such steps: 
1. When a file passes through the firewall, the firewall will try to determine 
whether it is a non-text file. This can be done by analysing the header of 
the file or by calling extemal programs such as gunzip. The firewall does 
not use the suffix of the file to determine the file type but looks into the 
real content of the file. In this way, the firewall can detect undesired files 
whose suffix are deliberately renamed to other types of suffix or undesired 
files that have no suffix at all. 
2. If the file is a non-text file, then the firewall calls an appropriate program 
to extract the text. For example, gz files will be extracted by the program 
gunzip. If the file is a text file, the firewall will feed this file to the content 
filtering component directiy. 
3. The firewall feeds the extracted text into the content filtering component. 
4. After the content filtering component finishes, the firewall calls an 
appropriate program to repack the filtered result into its received format. 
5. The firewall transfers the repacked non-text file to the destination. 
It should be noted that in some cases password might be needed to extract password-
protected files. The firewall does not know the password thus cannot extract the files 
for checking. Therefore, such files should be retained at the firewall and users are 
required to extract the files for the firewall. 
In section 4.2, we mentioned that the filtering methods used by the content filtering 
component can be as simple as a basic keyword-matching method, or other more 
sophisticated methods. However, as we will show in Chapter 5, there are several 
drawbacks with the basic simple keyword-matching method. We will discuss those 
drawbacks and propose an "advanced" filtering method using automatic text 
categorisation techniques in Chapter 5. 
Chapter 5 
An Advanced Content Filtering Method 
This chapter proposes and implements an advanced content filtering method based on 
text categorisation techniques to replace the basic keyword-matching filtering method. 
5.1 Need for Advanced Filtering 
In the basic keyword-matching filtering method discussed in chapter 2, the filtering 
system considers a Web page to be undesired if the page contains some keywords that 
frequently appear in undesired sites. 
The problem with the basic keyword-matching filtering method is that words in Web 
pages could be deliberately modified to avoid being detected by the basic keyword-
matching filtering. The simplest cases are: When a character in the keyword is, 1) 
substituted by another visually similar character 2) or omitted. An example of 
substitution is to substitute the letter '1' with the number '1', therefore the word 
"violent" becomes "violent". An example of omission is to modify the word 
"pornographic" to "pomogaphic". In this way, interested audiences hardly notice any 
difference when browsing the Web pages but the basic keyword-matching program 
may fail to detect the undesired content. 
Although the filtering program may use pattern-matching algorithm in order to find 
undesired keyword out of the modified keyword, if the substituted or omitted 
characters are more than just one, such pattern-matching algorithm will inevitably 
become complex. Furthermore, such matching algorithm increases the possibility of 
"false positive", which may cause the content filtering program to wrongly block 
legitimate Web pages. 
Another problem with the basic keyword-matching method is that it is hard to 
construct a keyword list that can sufficiently identify Web pages we want to block, at 
the same time cause few "false positive" blocking. For example, we want to block 
pornographic contents and put the keyword "vagina" to the list, and then the filtering 
program may wrongly block Web pages of vagina monologues, which are true stories 
of women's experiences with domestic violence and gender discrimination. 
To improve the filtering, we propose an advanced content filtering method based on 
automatic text categorisation techniques. 
5.2 Introduction to Automatic Text Categorisation 
Automatic text categorisation arose due to the ever-expanding amount of text 
documents available in digital form. With huge amount of digital documents, it is not 
only time-consuming but also costly for people to manually classify such documents. 
Therefore, research on how to automate the text categorisation attracts more and more 
attention recently. 
Automated text categorisation is a supervised learning task, defined as assigning pre-
defined category labels to new documents based on the likelihood suggested by a 
training set of labelled documents [21]. It should be noted that in traditional automatic 
text categorisation, documents do not have hyperlinks pointing to other documents, not 
like the Web pages. 
The applications of automatic text categorisation include data mining, natural language 
processing, reorganising huge documents collections, information retrieval, Web 
searching, etc. For example, in data mining, automatic text categorisation can be used 
to remove invalid or irrelevant documents. Another example is that automatic text 
categorisation can be used to catalogue news articles so that a user may easily find 
articles he might be interested in. 
5.2.1 Observations 
There are several important observations making the problem of content filtering for 
firewalls different from traditional text categorisation problems: 
1. In traditional text categorisation, the system is required to assign documents to 
different categories (usually more than 10). 
In the problem of content filtering at firewall, the filtering program only needs 
to make a binary decision, that is, it only needs to answer "yes" or "no" to this 
question: "Does the URL that users want to access belong to certain forbidden 
category thus should be filtered?" Uniform Resource Locator (URL) is a 
unique name used to identify a Web page [7]. For example, the URL 
www.ieee.org is used to identify the Web page of Institute of Electrical and 
Electronic Engineers. 
2. In traditional text categorisation, most systems such as K-Nearest-Neighbour 
and Support Vector Machine require 'positive' and 'negative' training 
documents, 'positive' training documents are examples of documents having 
the same criteria with the documents to be classified, 'negative' training 
documents are examples of documents that are not in the same category as the 
documents to be classified. 
The filtering system we propose only requires 'positive' training documents 
without using any 'negative' training documents. For example, if we want to 
filter pornographic contents, we only need to collect some examples of 
pornographic contents and use the examples to train our filtering system. 
3. In traditional text categorisation problem, documents to be categorised are 
considered to be independent from each other. Successful categorisation of one 
document does not provide hints to determine the categories of other 
documents. 
In the problem of content filtering firewall, most Web pages have hyper-links 
pointing to other related Web pages. Let a user wants to access a Web page t/, 
if Uis not considered to be in the undesired category, the filtering program can 
follow hyper-links (if hyper-links are available) within U and examine whether 
the followed pages are in the undesired category. If most of the followed pages 
belong to the undesired category, the first page U may be considered to be in 
the undesired category thus should be filtered too. Although it is possible that a 
Web page contains hyper-links that are not very much related to the page itself, 
in the real world most Web pages have hyper-hnks to other related pages. 
5.3 Major Automatic Text Categorisation Approaches 
Major automatic text categorisation approaches include Naïve Bayes (NB) [13], K-
Nearest Neighbour (KNN) [21], Decision Tree (DTree) [1]. Other text categorisation 
approaches include Support Vector Machines (SVM) [12], Neural Network (NNet) 
[18], Rocchio [11], First Order Inductive Learner (FOIL) [19], etc. 
5.3.1 Naïve Bayes (NB) 
The Naïve Bayes probabihstic classifiers are commonly studied in machine learning 
[15]. The Naïve Bayes approach calculates a probabihty for each word in the 
document by calculating its relative frequency and uses these probabilities to assign a 
category to the document. The Naïve Bayes approach is widely used because of its 
simplicity and computational efficiency. 
Before classification, training documents need to be fed into the filtering system. The 
training documents are split into different parts based on subjects. Each of these parts 
contains similar documents and becomes a predefined category. Let Q denotes a 
predefined category, di denotes the document being classified and W denotes the words 
in the document, given a document di to be classified, the Naive Bayes approach uses 
the joint probabilities of the document's words and the predefined categories to 
estimate the probabilities of the document's categories. Naive Bayes assumes that the 
conditional probability of a word w; given a category P( wi\ck) is independent of the 
conditional probabiUties of any other word w,-given the same category P( wj \ Ck). The 
assumption of word independence makes the computation efficient because it does not 
use word combinations as prediction. But it should be noted that the assumption of 
word independence is not true for most documents in the real worid. Most words in 
real world documents are related. The assumption of word independence allows the 
conditional probability of the category given a document to be computed [14]: 
P{ck di) = P{ck)'P{di ck) ' ' A/ ' P{di) P{di) 
To calculate the conditional probabilities of presence of each word Wj given the 
category P( wj | Q the filtering system only needs to count the number of occurrence 
of each word under each category. 
Although the Naïve Bayes approach has been studied and used for many years [13], 
many other recent approaches such as K-Nearest Neighbour (KNN) and Support 
Vector Machines (SVM) outperform the Naïve Bayes approach in terms of 
classification performance [21]. Therefore, the Naïve Bayes approach is often used as 
baseline for comparisons with different automatic text categorisation approaches. 
5.3.2 K-Nearest Neighbour (KNN) 
K-Nearest Neighbour is a well-known statistical approach, which has been intensively 
studied in pattern recognition for over four decades [8]. K-Nearest Neighbour is 
among the top-performing automatic text categorisation methods. 
In general, given a document to be classified, the KNN categorisation system selects k 
most similar documents to the document being classified from the training documents, 
and uses the categories of the k documents to judge the categories of the document 
being classified. 
In the K-Nearest Neighbour approach, documents are represented by vectors of the 
words that appear in the documents. The similarity between the document being 
classified and the training documents can be measured by the Euclidean distance 
between the two documents' vectors or other functions [21]. For example, in Figure 5, 
because the training document A is closer to the document being classified X, A is 
considered to be more similar to X than B is. The similarity values between the 
document being classified and the k most similar training documents are used to 
calculate the possibility that the document being classified belongs to the k documents' 
categories. If two or more documents out of the K documents are in the same category, 
the similarity values are summed up. The possible categories are sorted by the sum of 
the similarity values. Only those categories with the sum of the similarity values higher 
than a certain threshold value are considered to be the categories that the document 
being classified belongs to. 
Figure 5 K-Nearest Neighbour 
The optimal threshold value can be determined through experiments using a subset of 
the training documents as documents to be classified. 
Let X denotes the document being classified, d denotes the training document set, c 
denotes the categories, sim(x, d i ) denotes the similarity between the document being 
classified jc and a training document du y { x , C j ) e {0,1} denotes whether the document x 
belongs to the category cj ( y = I for YES, and = 0 for NO), y { d i , C j ) e {0,1} denotes 
whether the document di belongs to the category cj, bj denotes the category-specific 
threshold for the category the decision rule in KNN can be written as [21]: 
y ( x , Cj) = ^ s i m { x , d i ) y ( d i , c j ) - bj 
die KNN 
The K-Nearest Neighbour approach is simple and effective. Because KNN's 
computation time is linear to the number of training documents, KNN is especially 
suitable for applications that require frequent updating of the training documents [20]. 
5.3.3 Decision Tree (DTree) 
Decision tree is a well-known machine learning approach to automatic induction of 
classification trees based on training data [15]. 
In the decision tree approach, each internal node of the decision tree has a test 
involving an attribute, and an outgoing branch for each possible outcome. Each leaf is 
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associated with a predefined category. In order to use the decision tree to classify 
documents, beginning with the root node, successive internal nodes are visited until a 
leaf is reached. At each internal node, the test for the node is applied to the document 
being classified. The outcome of the test at an internal node determines the branch 
traversed, and the next node visited. The category for the document being classified is 
the same category of the final leaf node. Thus, the conjunction of all the conditions for 
the branches from the root to a leaf constitutes one of the conditions for the category 
associated with the leaf [17]. 
Figure 6 (b) is a simple decision tree for the training set shown in Figure 6 (a). It can 
be observed from the training set that only documents which contain both the word 
"abstract" and the word "bibliography" should be classified into the category "Paper", 
and other documents should be classified into the category "Non-paper". 
Contains word "abstract" 
N O DocTiment Contains word 
"abstract" 
Contains word 
'Taiblio graph/' 
Category 
A YES YES Paper 
B YES m }hn-Paper 
C m YES ihn-Paper 
D m m }hn-Paper 
Contains word "bibliDgraph3r" 
YES 
(a) (b) 
Figure 6 An Example of A Simple Decision Tree 
To build the decision tree used for categorisation, the training documents set is 
recursively partitioned until all the documents in a partition have the same category. A 
new node is added to the decision tree for every partition. Initially, the decision tree 
only has a single root node for the entire training documents set. For a set of 
documents in a partition P, a test criterion T for further partitioning the set into P i , . . . , 
Pm is first determined. New nodes for PI, ... , Pm are created and these are added to 
the decision tree as children of the node for P. Also, the node for P is labelled with test 
r , and partitions PI, ... , Pm are then recursively partitioned. A partition in which all 
the documents have identical category labels is not partitioned further, and the leaf 
corresponding to it is labelled with the category [17]. 
Therefore, the steps for building a decision tree with the training documents shown in 
Figure 6 (a) are illustrated in Figure 7. 
Contains word 
"abstract" 
Contains word 
'abstract" 
Contains word 
"biblio graph)?" 
Contains word 
"abstract" 
Contains word 
"biblio graph/' 
Step 1 Step 1 Step 3 
Figure 7 Building Decision Tree 
If the decision tree in Figure 6 (b) is used to classify the documents in the training set, 
only document A is classified into the category "Paper" by the decision tree. All the 
other documents B, C and D are classified into the category "Non-paper" by the 
decision tree. 
Although its classification performance is not among the best, the decision tree 
algorithms are efficient for processing huge amounts of data [19]. Compared with the 
neural networks approach that can take large amounts of time and thousand of 
iterations, decision tree is efficient and is thus suitable for large training sets [17]. 
5.4 Proposed Advanced Content Filtering Method 
There have been some works in categorising Web pages using Naïve Bayes (NB), K-
Nearest Neighbour (KNN), etc. Yiming Yang, S. Slattery and R. Ghani compared the 
effectiveness of using NB, KNN and First Order Inductive Learner algorithms to 
classify Web pages [38]. They also investigated the use of hyperlinks, content of 
linked documents, and meta data about related Web sites and found that meta data can 
be extremely useful for improving classification accuracy [39]. Norbert Govert, 
Mounia Lalmas and Norbert Fuhr used an enhanced document representation that 
incorporates the structural and heterogeneous nature of Web documents [40]. But few 
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works have been done in how to filter undesired Web contents using automatic text 
categorisation methods. 
5.4.1 The Categorisation Method 
Based on the observations above and previous automatic text categorisation 
approaches, we propose a categorisation method for content filtering firewall to 
determine whether the URLs that a user requests belong to an undesired category or 
not. 
Each document is represented by a vector of word frequencies. The more similar two 
documents are, the closer the two documents' vectors are, thus the smaller angle 
between the two document's vectors is, and therefore, the higher the cosine value of 
the angle between the two documents' vectors is. Therefore, the similarity of two 
documents can be measured by the cosine of the angle between the two document 
YXY. vectors, which can be calculated by cosí X, Y) = , \ , where X and Y 
are the two document vectors. Training documents that belong to the undesired 
category must be fed into the filtering program. The filtering program calculates the 
similarity value to the other documents for each training document. Based on the 
similarity values of all training set, a threshold value is chosen. When a user wants to 
access a Web page, the filtering program calculates the Web page's similarity value to 
the undesired category and compares it with the threshold value to determine whether 
the Web page is in the undesired category. To calculate the page's similarity value to 
the undesired category, the system calculates its similarity value to each training 
document in that category, and then calculates the average of the n% highest similarity 
values, where n is a number such as 30. If the Web page's similarity value to the 
undesired category is less than the threshold value, the filtering program continues to 
get the next hyper-link within the Web page and calculates its similarity value to the 
undesired category, which will repeat for r times. If majority of the r links belong to 
the undesired category, the first Web page is considered to be in the undesired 
category thus should be blocked. 
Following are the detailed steps: 
1. Before the filtering program can be used to determine whether a URL belongs to 
certain undesired category or not, training documents that belong to the undesired 
category must first be fed into the filtering program. This needs to be done once 
when the filtering program runs for the first time and requires to be redone when a 
new category is requested (hence the training documents set changes). 
When the filtering program processes these documents, 
• Some common words are ignored. The reason is to avoid common words that 
might appear in any kind of categories, such as "the", "and", "for", etc. 
• Words with frequency less than certain threshold or a fixed number such as 2 
are ignored. The reason is to avoid "noise" words. 
• Words shorter than 2 letters are ignored. The reason is to avoid words like "a", 
"to", " o f , "in", etc. Another reason is to avoid special symbols like '?', 
etc. 
During the training time, the filtering program reads in the training documents that 
belong to the undesired category. The program counts the frequency of distinct 
words for each training document, adjusts the frequency weighting for keywords 
within different HTML tags, and then calculates and stores their frequency into 
different vectors. Each document has its own vectors to store the frequency for 
each distinct word appears in that document. 
2. Then the filtering program calculates the similarity value to the other documents 
for each training document: 
The similarity value sim( X, Y ) oi any two documents X and Y is cos( X, Y ) = 
, where X and Y are vectors of the frequency for distinct words 
appears in the documents [21]. 
The similarity value of one training document t to the other training documents can 
be calculated by averaging the similarity values of the document t and each of the 
other training documents, as — , where D Total number of training documents -1 
is set of the other training documents except the document t. 
3. The next step is to empirically set the threshold value (7) for this undesired 
category. The threshold value T will be compared with the similarity value of the 
document to be checked to the training documents. The document to be checked is 
considered to be in the undesired category if its similarity value to the training 
documents is greater than T. The chosen threshold value T should be less than most 
similarity values of training documents to the others. 
4. Suppose a user wants to access a Web page U, if the similarity value of U to the 
training documents of the undesired category is less than the threshold, i.e. Uis not 
considered to be in the undesired category, the filtering program continues to get 
the next hyper-link within U and examines its similarity value to the undesired 
category, which will repeat for r times. If majority of the r links belong to the 
undesired category, the first page C/is considered to be in the undesired category 
thus should be blocked. 
5.4.2 Choosing the Threshold 
We want to maximise the number of undesired pages that are successfully blocked by 
the filtering program, at the same time minimise the number of legitimate pages that 
are wrongly blocked. It can be observed that there exists trade-off between these two 
goals. To maximise the number of undesired pages that are successfully blocked, we 
need to decrease the threshold T. But to minimise the number of legitimate pages that 
are wrongly blocked, we need to increase the threshold T. 
We suggest that the threshold T should be higher than the similarity values of most 
training documents to the others. For example, the threshold T can be chosen so that 
the similarity values of 99% training documents to the others are higher than T. 
5.4.3 How the Entire Content FUtering Component Works 
Using the categorisation method above, the entire content filtering component works 
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as the following: 
Suppose a user requests to access the URL W, 
Step 1: The content filtering component checks the "allowed" URL list, which records 
URLs considered to be free of undesired contents. If W is in this list, the request is 
allowed without further examination. Be aware that the construction of such "allowed" 
list should be extremely careful; otherwise malicious sites could relay undesired 
contents from other sites even if those sites themselves contains no undesired contents. 
Step 2: The content filtering component checks the "undesired" URL list. The 
"undesired" URL list records URLs that contain undesired contents. If W is in this Ust, 
the filtering component will block the user's request for W. 
Step 3: The content filtering component retrieves W from the Internet and checks 
whether there are information descriptors such as PICS (Platform for Internet Content 
Selection) or meta-data descriptors available in W. The information descriptors and 
meta-data descriptors have been discussed in Chapter 2. 
If there are descriptors available and according to such descriptors the URL W 
contains undesired content, the filtering component will block the user's request. 
But if there are descriptors available and according to such descriptors the URL W 
contains no undesired content, the filtering component still needs to do further 
examination of W. The reason is that some meta-data are self-regulated by the site 
owner, as discussed in Chapter 2; therefore malicious sites could make up false 
descriptors for their pages in order to get around content filtering. 
Step 4: The content filtering component feeds W into the categorisation component. If 
the categorisation component reports that W belongs to any of the undesired 
categories, the filtering component will do the followings: 
1) Add W into the training set of the undesired category for the categorisation 
component, in order to increase accuracy of the further categorisation. 
2) Add W to the "undesired" URL list, in order to improve performance of further 
filtering because other users' request for W will be blocked without examination for 
W's category. 
3) Block the user's request for W and record relevant information to the log file. 
Step 5: The content filtering component allows the user's request. 
To summarise, the content filtering component's action to a user's request for a Web 
site W is: 
Allow, if WG {"allowed.URLUst"} 
Deny, if W G {"undesired URL list"} 
Action to request for W = ̂  Deny, if V descriptors for W A descriptors G {" undesired content"} 
Deny, if W does not pass the categorisation component 
Allow, otherwise 
5.5 Implementation and Analysis of the Advanced 
Content Filtering Method 
We have implemented the advanced content filtering method as a separate program 
with Java 1.4. We also collect pages from various Web sites and use them to test the 
filtering system. The experimental results have been very encouraging. Appendix C 
includes the source codes of the implementation. 
5.5.1 Data 
In the following experiment, our system aims to filter Web sites with Adult contents. 
We collect 487 URLs from the Adult category of Google (URL: 
http://directory.googlexom/rop/Adult/). Web sites in this category are reviewed and 
classified as containing adult contents by human beings editors. Within this category, 
we obtain the list of top 500 adult Web sites by searching with the keyword pom. Out 
of the 500 URLs, 13 are invalid or unavailable and we exclude them. We use the 
remaining 487 URLs as training data. 
For all the URLs (385 when the data were collected) under the Adult category of 
Yahoo! (URL: http://dir.yahooxom/Business_andjEconomy/Shoppingj2^ 
Sex/Directories/), we exclude those URLs that are also in the training set or are 
invalid. We use the remaining 329 URLs as test data. The filtering system is used to 
recognise those URLs as containing adult contents. 
Also, to determine how good our system is in recognising Web sites without adult 
contents, URLs that do not contain Adult contents are collected from 10 top directories 
of Google. Those categories are: arts, business, science, computers, news, shopping, 
games, society, health, and sports. For each category, we obtain a list by searching 
with the keyword same as the category name (keyword arts for the arts category, 
keyword business for the business category, etc.). Then for each list, we select 20 
URLs at the top, 20 URLs in the middle and 20 URLs at the bottom. For the selected 
600 URLs, we exclude those invalid or unavailable URLs and get 587 URLs. 
Totally, 1,403 URLs are collected and used for the experiment. 
5.5.2 Experiment Results 
The experiment is run for multiple times. For each run, we randomly select 10% of the 
test adult URLs and non-adult URLs as the test data for this run. Using the same 
training data, the filtering program calculates the similarity values to the training data 
(adult URLs) for every test documents. Then with different thresholds, the filtering 
program calculates the corresponding blocking rate and over-blocking rate. When the 
multiple runs finish, the program calculates the 95% confidence intervals of blocking 
rate and over-blocking rate for different thresholds. 
The following figure is the result for a typical test run. The Y-axis is the similarity 
value to Adult category calculated by the filtering system and its range is between 0 
and 1. The X-axis includes the set of adult URLs tested and the set of non-adult URLs 
tested. Both sets of URLs are separately sorted ascending by their similarity values to 
Adult category. Test URLs are given high similarity values if the filtering system 
believes those URLs contain adult contents. Test URLs are given low similarity values 
if the filtering system believes those URLs do not contain adult contents. 
Figure 8 Experiment results of Adult URLs and Non-Adult URLs 
It can be clearly observed that our filtering system gives Web sites that actually 
contains adult contents quite high similarity values to the Adult category (most are 
higher than 0.2), while giving Web sites free of adult contents quite low values 
(generally less than 0.2). Therefore, with different threshold values, we can obtain the 
following results: 
Table 1 Results for filtering Web sites with adult contents (100 test runs) 
Blocking 
Rate 
(mean) 
Over-
Blocking 
Rate(mean) 
Threshold 95% Confidence 
Interval of Blocking 
Rate 
95% Confidence 
Interval of Over-
Blocking Rate 
99.35% 4.09% 0 . 1 0 99.21% t o 99.48% 3.75% t o 4.43% 
98.99% 2.03% 0 . 1 2 98.84% t o 99.15% 1.79% t o 2.28% 
98.80% 0.92% 0 . 1 4 98.62% t o 98.98% 0.74% t o 1.09% 
98.80% 0 . 59% 0 . 1 6 98.62% t o 98.98% 0.46% t o 0.71% 
97.41% 0.48% 0 . 1 8 97.13% t o 97.68% 0.36% t o 0.59% 
95.34% 0.34% 0 . 2 94.98% t o 95.71% 0.24% t o 0.44% 
93.67% 0% 0 . 2 2 93.27% t o 94.07% 0% t o 0% 
. . . 
Total number of adult URLs tested by the filtering system: 329 
Total number of non-adult URLs tested by the filtering system: 587 
Total number of adult URLs used to train the filtering system: 487 
Blocking Rate - number of adult URLs blocked by the filtering system 
Total number of adult URLs tested by the filtering system 
Over Blocking Rate - number of non - adult URLs blocked by the filtering system 
Total number of non - adult URLs tested by the filtering system 
It can be observed that the performance of our filtering system is quite satisfactory. 
5.5.3 Comparison with Existing Filtering Systems 
The NetProtect project in Europe evaluates the filtering efficiency and the over-
blocking rate of existing filtering systems. In year 2001, 2,794 URLs with 
pornographic content and 1,655 URLs with normal content were collected and used to 
test 50 commercial filtering solutions [37]. Because the theme of NetProtect's test is 
very similar to that of our experiment, their results can be used to compare with ours. 
NetProtect's test results for the 10 most popular filtering tools are as follows: 
RiltéfifigvTìooIs - / Blocking Effectiveness 
. Overblocking 
; rate 
BizGuard 55% 10% 
Cyber Patrol 52% 2% 
CYBER sitter 46% 3% 
Cyber Snoop 65% 23% 
Internet Watcher 2000 30% 0% 
Net Nanny 20% 5% 
Norton ntemet Security 45% 6% 
Optenet 79% 25% 
SurfMonkey 65% 11% 
X-Stop 65% 4% 
Figure 9 Evaluation of existing filtering systems 
Comparing the above table with results for our system, it is clear that our filtering 
system outperforms the existing filtering systems in filtering Web sites with adult 
contents. It should also be noted that our filtering system does not use any blacklist or 
whiteUst, therefore we avoid the huge costs introduced by manually classifying and 
maintaining such lists. 
Chapter 6 
Filtering Inappropriate Images 
This chapter first introduces problems with inappropriate images, and then discusses 
previous image filtering systems. Finally, it covers the preliminary alternative method 
and the experimental results. 
6.1 Introduction 
The method proposed in the previous chapter only utilises text information but ignores 
images within the Web pages. That could lead to the following problems: 
• Inappropriate text can be converted to images in order to get through the 
filtering system. For example, a Web site designer can convert a forbidden 
article to one (or multiple) image file(s) in JPEG, GIF or other format, and 
embed such images in a Web page. Inappropriate content in image form is able 
to get through text-based filtering systems. However, it is troublesome and 
time-consuming for Web site designers to consistently convert all the text 
content to images. Besides that, the converted images are usually much larger 
than the original texts in file size. Therefore, such Web sites are less preferable 
for users, especially for those users with low-band Memet connection, such as 
modem. 
• Watermarking techniques can be used to embed inappropriate content into 
images to get through filtering. Embedded information cannot be observed 
visually or be extracted without knowing the key, which makes it hard for the 
filtering system to detect the embedded inappropriate content. However, to 
retrieve the inappropriate content, the viewer must collaborate with the outsider 
to obtain the key, and then use specific watermarking tools to extract embedded 
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information from the watermarked images. Nowadays, trying to thwart such 
elaborate collaboration between the insiders and the outsiders is still far beyond 
the capacity of any existing Internet filtering system. 
• For certain inappropriate categories, such as pornographic contents, Web pages 
may have many inappropriate images and few texts by nature, thus making 
text-based filtering methods less ineffective. 
6.2 Previous Inappropriate Image Filtering Systems 
6.2.1 Fleck-Forsyth-Bregler System 
This system [33] classifies images as pornographic or non-pornographic. The 
published results are 52 percent sensitivity (i.e., 48 percent false negatives) and 96 
percent specificity (i.e., 4 percent false positives). It has an average processing time of 
6 minutes per image, which makes it unsuitable for real-time applications. 
The system first locates images containing large areas of skin-colour region. Then, 
within these areas, it finds elongated regions and groups them into possible human 
limbs and connected groups of limbs. Images containing sufficientiy large skin-colour 
groups of possible limbs are reported as potentially containing naked people. 
6.2.2 WIPE System 
WIPE system [34][35] [36] analyses image content and classifies it as pornographic or 
non-pornographic. It has 96 percent sensitivity, and 91 percent specificity, and the 
average processing time is less than 1 second per image. 
The system used feature extraction using wavelet transform and compares the result 
witii pre-stored vectors if the image is a photograph (versus drawing). Manually 
generated images are distinguished on the basis of tones: sharp tones for manually 
generated images versus continuous tones for photographs. 
The system uses a database containing thousands of objectionable images and 
thousands of benign images (10,000 photographic images) to find all images that are 
close to the test image. Every image has a feature vector that encompasses information 
such as texture, colour, etc. Images are classified according to those vectors. 
6.3 Comments on Previous Image Filtering Systems 
Although some existing image filtering systems produce considerately good results, 
for as real-time filtering systems, it is crucial to take into account of the time delay 
introduced by the image analysis. If the average delay for a Web page were longer than 
5 to 10 seconds, it would be unbearable for most users. 
In Fleck-Forsyth-Bregler system, the average processing time per image is 6 minutes. 
In WIPE system, the average time per image is around one second. For a typical Web 
page that contains 5 or 10 images, the delay could vary from 5 seconds to 30 minutes. 
That might not be satisfactory enough for a real-time filtering system. 
Besides that, those systems initially aim at filtering pornographic images only. There 
are no statistics or experiments to determine whether those systems can be easily 
applied in filtering other undesired content, such as violence, racism, etc. 
Finally, undesired contents embedded in watermarked images cannot be easily 
extracted if the key is unknown. It is also very time-consuming to try to detect whether 
there are embedded information within images, what are the embedded information 
and whether the embedded information are undesired. 
6.4 A Preliminary Alternative Method to Complicated 
Image Analysis Methods 
In order to avoid long delay and complexity of the filtering algorithm, instead of using 
complicated image analysis techniques, we may use meta data in HTML documents to 
provide some initial filtering. In particular, we may use a preliminary alternative 
method of utilising the 'alf attribute of HTML <img> tag. 
The 'alf text of an image will be displayed if one of the followings is true: 
• The corresponding image cannot be displayed, either because the viewer 
disables the 'display image' option of the Internet browser or because the 
image is not available at that moment. 
• The Viewer is using a text-based Internet browser such as lynx\ therefore, the 
image is not displayed. 
• The viewer's mouse is positioned over the corresponding image. 
The purpose of 'alf attribute is to provide the viewers with alternative information to 
the corresponding image. Because most 'alf texts are related to their corresponding 
images, it is possible for the filtering system to utilise the 'alt texts in order to interpret 
the content of the corresponding image, without the need to analyse the image content 
by using complicated image analysis methods. 
The advantage of this method is its simplicity and high speed. The filtering system is 
still text-based; therefore, the system avoids the costs or delay introduced by 
computation-intensive image processing. In addition, to accomplish the 'alf attribute 
handling, only a few modifications needed to be done to the HTML parsing component 
of the original filtering system. 
Following is the comparison table of experimental results between utilising the 'alf 
attribute and not utilising the 'alf attribute. We test with the same data used in the 
precious section. Our filtering system utilises the 'alf attribute by including the 'alt' 
texts as part of the page's texts, which only introduces few processing costs. 
Table 2 Effectiveness of utilising the 'alt' attribute 
Not utilising 'alf Utilising 'alf 
Threshold Blocking Rate 
Over-blocking 
Rate 
Blocking Rate 
Over-blocking 
Rate 
0.12 99.08% 1.53% 99.08% 2.21% 
0.14 98.78% 1.20% 98.78% 1.53% 
0.16 98.48% 0.68% 98.48% 0.51% 
0.19 94.53% 0.51% 94.83% 0.34% 
0.21 93.62% 0.34% 93.92% 0.17% 
0.22 92.10% 0% 92.40% 0% 
The results above show that the preliminary method archives slightly better results 
than the original filtering system at most cases. 
Despite of its simplicity and high speed, the limitations of this method are: 
• Since the 'alt' attribute is optional, not all images have such attributes. 
• Not all the 'alt' texts are accurate or meaningful. 
Chapter 7 
Using Content Filtering Firewall to 
Prevent Computer Virus Propagation 
This chapter discusses how to use the content filtering firewall to prevent computer 
virus propagation through the Internet. 
7.1 Introduction to Computer Virus 
Computer virus is a computer program that can infect other computer programs by 
modifying them in such a way as to include a (possibly evolved) copy of itself [6]. 
Although some computer viruses are comparatively harmless, most computer viruses 
may cause damage to or destroy files and disks. Harms caused by computer viruses 
also include the following: 
• Occupying disk space and/or main memory. 
• Using up CPU processing time 
• Costing the time and efforts in detecting and removing the computer viruses. 
• Disclosure of user data. 
7.2 Previous Anti-Virus Approaches 
Major previous anti-virus approaches include [4]: 
• Virus signature Scanner 
Virus signature scanners search suspected files for certain signatures that are 
known to exist in computer viruses. More advanced computer virus scanners 
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use heuristic technique to find suspicious operation instructions within 
executable files in order to detect possible new computer viruses. An example 
of the suspicious operation instructions is to modify the first few bytes of an 
executable file, which is a common operation and symptom of computer 
viruses. 
The disadvantage of virus signature scanner is that it requires frequently 
updating of the virus signatures. Otherwise, even with the heuristic technique, 
the virus scanner still cannot find all newly emerged computer viruses. But 
nowadays many virus signature scanners have the abiUty to automatically 
update virus signatures through the network at regular intervals, thus alleviate 
this problem to some extent. 
Integrity Checker 
Integrity checkers record the signatures of executable files beforehand while 
they are not infected by computer viruses, then regularly compare those 
original signatureis with the signatures of the existing executable files. If an 
executable file's signature is found to be different with its original signature, 
the executable file may has been modified, which is a symptom of virus 
infection. Note that integrity checkers could give false alarm of virus infection 
because not all modifications to the executable files are caused by computer 
viruses. Therefore, integrity checkers may prompt the users for what actions 
should be performed to the modified executable files. Users may need to have 
some knowledge of their computer systems in order to discern legitimate 
modifications to executable files from virus infection. 
To record the original signatures, the integrity checker programs need to run 
beforehand when the executable files are in the state of not being infected. But 
in the case of filtering computer viruses at firewall, it is hard to get such 
original signatures of the executable files to be checked, thus making it hard to 
use the integrity checking technique for filtering computer viruses at firewall. 
Behaviour/Activity monitor 
Behaviour/activity monitors try to detect suspicious activities of the running 
programs. Suspicious activities are common activities of virus-infected 
programs such as modifying the boot sector of the hard disks so that every time 
when the operating system boots, the virus-infected program will execute. 
The major difficulty with using behaviour/activity monitor for filtering virus at 
firewall is that the firewall bastion host may have different architecture and 
operating systems from internal users' machines. For example, in a scenario 
where parts of the internal users' machines are DBM-PC compatible computers 
running Microsoft Windows operating systems and the other parts are 
Macintosh Apple machines, and the firewall bastion host is a Unix or Linux 
machine, it is very hard to execute suspicious programs (which could be 
Microsoft Windows executables or Macintosh executables) in the bastion host 
to do behaviour/activity monitoring. 
Therefore, this thesis considers virus signature scanner to be the most preferred 
approach for filtering computer viruses at firewall. Behaviour/activity monitor could 
also be an option if most internal users' machines and the firewall bastion host have 
the same architecture and operating systems. 
It should be noted that there is no algorithm exists that can precisely detect all possible 
viruses, which was proved by Fred Cohen in "Computer Viruses - Theory and 
Experiments" 1984 [6]. No matter how good the virus signature scanner is, filtering 
computer viruses at firewall cannot filter all computer viruses without false positive. 
What can be expected is that the filtering is practically good enough to filter as many 
computer viruses as possible. 
7.3 Virus Propagation Through The Internet 
This section introduces the major two ways of computer virus propagation through the 
Internet: E-mail and HTTP. Since HTTP is much simpler than E-mail, this section 
mainly describes how the E-mail system works. 
In those early years when computer viruses firstly appeared, the major media of 
computer vims propagation is floppy disk. But with the widely use of the Internet, the 
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Intemet has become the major media of computer virus propagation. 
E-mail and HTTP are the major two ways for computer viruses to come from the 
Intemet into the internal networks. 
• Computer viruses can propagate through E-mail if users inadvertently choose 
to send to other people virus-infected files as E-mail attachments. Besides that, 
some computer viruses such as Nimda can automatically send themselves 
through the Intemet as E-mail attachments. Such computer vimses are able to 
complete the entire E-mail sending process, without the need for any 
intervention or notice of the users. Such kind of computer vimses can 
propagate more actively since they have the ability to complete the E-mail 
sending process by themselves. 
• For HTTP, inexperienced users may download "free" or "trial" programs from 
the Intemet, which could possibly be vims-infected. When such downloaded 
programs are executed, the user's machine is infected by the computer vims. In 
addition to being able to propagate through E-mail, some computer vimses 
such as the Nimda vims can also infect computers used as Web servers. When 
users browse such vims-infected Web servers via HTTP, their machines may 
also be infected. 
7.3.1 MaU Standard 
With the original Intemet mail standard, only ASCII text was supported. The MIME 
(Multipurpose Intemet Mail Extensions) protocol is a set of extensions to the original 
Intemet mail standard. MIME provides a standard for encoding mail using different 
language character sets, for creating mail that contain non-text content, and for 
segmenting mails into pieces that can be sent separately. Under MIME, mail 
attachments can not only be text files, but also be executable, graphics and music files, 
etc. The set of data at the beginning of a MIME mail is called MIME headers. The 
MIME headers contain information about what type of data the mail contains, 
directives for the mail server, etc. 
7.3.2 Email DeUvery 
1. Sending E-mail Messages 
When a user sends E-mail messages, the messages are firstly sent from his/her 
client computer to the mail server. The mail server usually is an internal mail 
server in the same network as the user, but it could also be an external mail 
server outside the user's network. 
In most cases. Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) is used to send E-mail 
messages from the user's computer to the mail server. The SMTP protocol 
specifies how the mail delivery system passes messages across from one 
machine to another. 
Another way to send E-mail messages is through Web-based E-mail interface, 
such as Hotmail. In this case, the Web is used as an interface and the Web 
server receives the user's input then delivers the messages to the mail server. In 
this case, the protocol used between the user's client computer and the Web 
server is HTTP. 
2. Relaying E-mail Messages 
Normally E-mail messages need to be relayed between many mail servers 
before the messages can finally arrive at their destination. The protocol used to 
transfer E-mail messages between the relaying mail servers is SMTP. 
3. Retrieving E-mail Messages 
When a user tries to retrieve E-mail messages from the mail server, the 
protocols used by his/her client computer and the mail server can be one of the 
following: 
• Post Office Protocol (POP). POP is used to transfer E-mail messages from 
a permanent mailbox to a local computer possibly without permanent 
connectivity [7]. 
• Internet Message Access Protocol (MAP). MAP is an alternative to POP 
but with more powerful functions. MAP allows a user to dynamically 
create, delete, or rename mailboxes and provides other extended 
functionality such as obtain information about a message or examine header 
fields without retrieving the entire message [7]. 
Another way to retrieve E-mail messages is through Web-based E-mail 
interface. The Web server retrieves E-mail messages from the mail server and 
sends the messages (in form of Web pages) to the user's computer via HTTP 
protocol. 
7.4 Proposed Architecture of Using Content Filtering 
Firewall to Prevent Computer Viruses Propagation 
In addition to educating users on anti-virus knowledge and deploying frequently 
updated real-time anti-virus software to users' machines, to protect against computer 
virus, we can use the content filtering firewall to filter computer virus so as to provide 
further protection for users. Filtering computer virus at firewall is especially useful for 
the most vulnerable user group ~ inexperienced users who do not have enough 
competent computer knowledge on computer virus protection. 
This thesis considers three cases. They are: 1) When no encryption is used for the 
network traffic; 2) When users use encryption for the network traffic; 3) When 
computer virus encrypts itself before passing through the firewall, then decrypts itself 
at the user's machine. 
7.4.1 No Encryption is Used for the Network Traffic 
When no encryption is used for the network traffic, the virus signature scanner at 
firewall can search the network traffic passing through the firewall for virus signatures. 
If certain virus signature is found in the traffic, the traffic is blocked by the firewall. It 
is very similar to content filtering for text files using the keyword-matching method, 
but in this case, the keywords are computer virus signatures, not undesired strings. 
The proposed architecture of filtering viruses at firewall for E-mail and HTTP is as 
shown in Figure 10. 
SMTP 
POP or MAP 
HTTP 
Figure 10 Architecture of Filtering Viruses At Firewall 
It can be observed From Figure 10 that there are three possible channels through which 
computer viruses can pass through the firewall: 
1. Traffic between the external relaying SMTP mail server and the internal mail 
server 
2. Traffic between the external SMTP mail server and the internal user's client 
computer 
3. Traffic between the external Web-based mail server and the internal user's 
client computer 
Therefore, in order to prevent computer viruses propagation through E-mail, solely 
filtering computer virus for traffic between the external SMTP mail servers and the 
internal network is not enough. We also need to filter computer virus for HTTP traffic 
to provide virus protection for Web-based E-mail. 
It should be noted that filtering computer virus for HTTP traffic not only provides 
vims protection for Web-based E-mail, but also provides virus protection for 
downloading files via Web. 
7.4.2 Users Use Encryption for the Network Traffic 
If users use encryption for the network traffic, the traffic passing through the firewall 
is in an encrypted state. Not knowing the decryption key, the virus signature scanner 
cannot decrypt the encrypted traffic, thus cannot check the traffic for virus signatures. 
There are several possible approaches in which encryption is used for network traffic 
and filtering virus at firewall is still possible: 
• Do not allow the internal users to do encryption themselves but let the firewall 
to do encryption, such as using VPN (Virtual Private Network). The network 
traffic between the firewall and the external network is encrypted, but the 
network traffic between the firewall and the internal users' machines is not 
encrypted. Therefore, the virus signature scanner at the firewall can still search 
the network traffic for virus signatures. The disadvantage is that since the 
internal network traffic between the firewall and the users' machines is not 
encrypted, an insider has the chance to sniff others' network traffic. 
• Let the firewall records all the users' decryption keys to decrypt the network 
traffics. This might be less preferred because if the firewall is compromised 
and the attacker captures the decryption keys, all the users' network traffic will 
be known to the attacker. 
7.4.3 Computer Virus Encrypts Itself before Passing 
Through the Firewall, then Decrypts Itself at User's Machine 
Some computer virus may encrypt themselves before passing through the firewall, then 
decrypt themselves at the user's machine. In this case, the computer virus actually is a 
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polymorphic virus, which can produce varied versions of itself. 
Strictly, if the computer virus can only use one encryption scheme with a variable 
encryption key, it is not a polymorphic virus. Vims signature scanner may easily find 
this kind of computer virus because its decryption part is always the same and thus can 
be used as the signature. Like in the following picture, the decryption part is always 
the same. 
Decryption Part Encrypted Body 
Even if the computer virus is a true polymorphic virus, which can use different 
encryption schemes, the virus signature scanner may still find this virus, provided that 
the virus scanner knows all signatures for each of the encryption schemes used by this 
virus. 
Like in the following pictures, the computer virus could be like 
^ 1 ¿Lyr^pjiQi^kiiAi i' Encrypted Body 
or like 
Encrypted Body 
To detect such virus, the virus signature scanner needs to know that decryption part A 
and decryption part B are both possible signatures of the vims. 
7.5 Limitation 
Solely filtering computer vims at firewall is not enough to ehminate computer vims 
propagation because computer vimses could also propagate via floppy disks or modem 
dial-in connections, which do not go through the firewall. 
Therefore, filtering computer vims at firewall should not be used as the only approach 
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to protect against computer viruses, though it does provide some additional protection. 
Other anti-virus approaches such as deploying real-time anti-vims programs to users' 
client machines should also be used. 
Chapter 8 
Proposed Attack on Content Filtering 
Firewall 
In previous chapters' discussion for content filtering, there are two assumptions: 1) the 
network traffic is not encrypted or can be decrypted by the filtering program at the 
firewall; 2) the traffic is in recognised format such as HTML or can be converted to 
recognised format by external programs. In this chapter, we discuss the situations 
where any of the two assumptions do not exist. 
8.1 Proposed Attack on Content Filtering Firewall 
In this section, we propose an attack to get around the content filtering firewall. This 
attack shows the difficulty the content filtering firewall encounters when end-to-end 
encryption for the network traffic is used. 
This attack utilises techniques including Java Applet and XML (Extensible Markup 
Language). Java Applet is a program written in Java language that can be sent along 
with a Web page to a user and executes (with restrictions) in the user's machine. XML 
is used to describe, store and exchange data [10]. In XML, tags are not predefined and 
must be defined by the user. 
8.1.1 Using Java Applet to Get Around the Content Filtering 
Firewall 
Suppose an outsider wants to display pornographic content to internal users behind a 
content filtering firewall, he can first encrypt the pornographic content, put the key and 
the encrypted text into a XML file, and then create a Java applet capable of decrypting 
such XML file. When the internal users try to access that pornographic site, the XML 
file and the Java applet can pass through the content filtering firewall without being 
blocked. Because the firewall cannot decrypt the encrypted text (actually the firewall 
does not even know that the XML file contains encrypted text), the firewall cannot 
determine that the XML file should be blocked. Then at the internal users' machines, 
the encrypted content will be decrypted by the Java Applet and displayed in the user's 
Internet browsers. 
This kind of attack has been successfully implemented and tested, as shown in Figure 
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Figure 11 Applet and XML Attack Demonstration 
Usually Internet browsers such as Internet Explorer or Netscape Communicator use 
Extensible Stylesheet Language (XSL) to display the content of XML files. But to 
provide the decryption ability needed in this attack, this thesis uses Java API for XML 
Processing (JAXP) from Sun Microsystems, Inc [2, 3, 9,16, 28]. 
In Figure 11, the Internet browser displays the file xml.html, which includes a Java 
Applet (as a separate file). Once started, this Java Applet first connects to the external 
server and retrieves the XML file ciphertext.xml then decrypts the encrypted text in it 
using the decryption key in the same file. The XML file ciphertext.xml contains both 
the encrypted text and the decryption key. 
The XML document ciphertext.xml: 
<?xml version=''1.0"?> 
<secret> 
<encryptmethod>Additive ciphers</encryptmethod> 
<key>3</key> 
<ciphertext>pbu</ciphertext> 
</secret> 
From Figure 11, it can be observed that this attack is successful. The reason that the 
content filtering firewall cannot prevent the string 'sex' being displayed to the users is 
because the decryption from 'pbu' to 'sex' happens in the users' terminal machines 
within the internal network. 
Although it is not compulsory to use XML for such kind of attack, combining Java and 
XML makes the attack more extensible. 
8.1.2 Possible Solutions to this Attack 
The simplest solution to this attack is to let the firewall block all Java applets. To block 
Java applets, the firewall can find and rewrite the <applet> tags in the HTML files to 
empty tags, so that the Java Applets will not be downloaded to the users' machinés. 
This solution totally eliminates this kind of attack, but the obvious disadvantage is that 
other legitimate Java applets are also blocked. 
A better solution is to block applets from distrusted sites and to accept applets from 
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trusted sites only. Although it is possible that even trusted sites could contain 
malicious Java applets, the chance is much lower than distrusted sites. 
8.2 Observation From the Attack Proposed 
It can be observed from the attack proposed that content filtering firewall would fail to 
find undesired content if the network traffic is encrypted and cannot be decrypted at 
the firewall, or more generally, if the network traffic is in a form that the firewall 
cannot interpret correctly. 
For example, if a document is in a specific format that can only be processed by 
certain program, the content filtering firewall cannot check the content of this 
document unless the firewall have detailed knowledge about this specific format, or 
have the tool to convert this document into recognised format to the firewall. 
It should also be noted that the content filtering firewall could choose to block the 
network traffic if the filtering firewall finds that the network traffic is encrypted and 
the content cannot be examined, which has been discussed in 7.4.2. But for the attack 
we propose, the content filtering firewall is not even aware that the network traffic is 
encrypted. The content filtering firewall only knows that the XML file is a text file 
without undesired content in it. It is the Java applet who interprets the XML file into 
undesired content and displays the content at the user's terminal machine. Internal 
users do not need to understand or intervene how the encryption and decryption work. 
Chapter 9 
Implementation of A Content Filtering 
Firewall 
Based on the architecture proposed in Chapter 4, a content filtering firewall has been 
successfuUy implemented using the firewaU package toolkit (FWTK). This chapter 
introduces details of the implementation. Details of the experimental network used in 
the implementation are in Appendix A. Details of the testing of the content filtering 
firewall are in Appendix B. 
9.1 Introduction to Firewall Package Toolkit (FWTK) 
The firewall package toolkit (FWTK) is from Trusted Information Systems, Inc [27]. It 
is a set of components, which can be used to create an application-level firewall 
system. The toolkit is chosen for this implementation because its source code is 
publicly available. Squid [31], a Web proxy cache that is an open-source software 
package, is also used to replace the FWTK's HTTP proxy. 
9.2 InstaUation and Coiifiguration of FWTK 
The first step of the implementation is to use FWTK to build up a basic firewall system 
(without content filtering functionality), which includes the following procedures: 
1. Clean up the bastion host 
The bastion host is the machine in which the firewall resides and runs. The bastion 
host has two network interfaces, one connects to the internal network and the other 
connects to the external network. This procedure includes: 
Disabling automatic IP forwarding between the two network interfaces of the 
bastion host, so that the bastion host does not automatically forward network 
traffics between the internal and external network. 
Disabling all unnecessary services or processes on the bastion host. Since the 
firewall program resides and runs on the bastion host, attackers may try to 
compromise the firewall by attacking other more vulnerable services on the 
bastion host. Therefore, the bastion host should provide as less services as 
possible. 
2. Build the executable files 
Because FWTK was originally designed for running in the UNIX family platform, to 
build the firewall in the Linux platform used by this implementation, some adjustments 
to the FWTK's source codes are needed. 
3. Integrate authentication into the firewall 
S/KEY is used as the authentication method. S/KEY is a one-time password system to 
provides secure authentication over network that are subject to eavesdropping and 
reply attacks. 
4. Set up the access control policy used by the firewall 
Access control policy is the set of rules about who can use the network services, what 
resources the users can use, what privileges the users can have. Network access control 
rules are specified in the file netperm-table in the directory /usr/local/etc of the bastion 
host. 
5. Test 
Network services through the firewall including HTTP, FTP, TELNET, RLOGIN and 
FINGER are tested. 
9.3 Integrating the Content Filtering Functionality 
The next step is to integrate content filtering functionality with the firewall. Modifying 
the firewall program should be very cautious, because this involves many pitfalls such 
as concurrency problems, consistence problems and lots of socket level operations. If 
such issues are not handled with careful consideration, the firewall program will not 
operate properly. 
Following are the procedures to integrate content filtering with firewall: 
1. Locate the corresponding source codes files of FWTK for different network 
services, such as HTTP, FTP and TELNET. 
2. Modify such source codes files to add in content filtering components. 
3. Restart the firewall program. 
9.3.1 Refining Filtering for Different Groups 
This section describes why different content filtering for different user groups is 
needed and presents a proposal. 
9.3.1.1 The Need of Different Content FUtering for Different Groups 
Usually organisations give different access controls for different groups of internal 
users. For example, universities may require students to use the Internet for academic 
purposes only; however, academic staff and network administrators may have less 
restriction on what sites they can access. The ability to apply different content filtering 
for different user groups provides greater flexibility. 
9.3.1.2 A Proposal and Implementation 
We propose that different content filtering for different user groups can be built using 
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the architecture shown in Figure 12. 
External 
Network i 
Original 
Firewall 
Components 
i i Internal Users 
Content Fflteiing Component Looking ID Taible Component 
Figure 12 Different Content Filtering for Different User Groups 
All the users are required to authenticate to the firewall first before their network 
requests can get through the firewall. The firewall records the user's ID in a table when 
the user authenticates, then uses the table to determine what content filtering rules 
should be applied for the user's subsequent traffic. 
For example, when a network administrator or staff authenticates to the firewall, 
content filtering may not be applied to his/her subsequent network traffic. But when a 
student authenticates to the firewall, content filtering may be applied to his/her 
network traffic. 
9.3.2 Configuration File for Filtering 
To allow the firewall administrators to specify content filtering rules such as what 
types of files should be checked for inappropriate content, this implementation 
modified the firewall program so that when the firewall is started, it firstly reads a 
configuration file and sets up the corresponding rules for content filtering. 
In this implementation, administrators can specify the following in the configuration 
file: 
• The strings to be checked or replaced 
• The types of files to be checked 
• The external programs to be used for extracting or re-packing non-text files 
• The user groups whose network traffic should be checked 
• The user groups whose network traffic should not be checked 
The configuration file has syntax similar to the configuration files of Microsoft 
Windows operating systems, such as win.ini or system32.ini. 
An example of the configuration file is given below: 
[FILTERS] 
sex 
***** 
[TAR] 
tar -xf OLDFILE 
tar -cf NEWFILE 
[ZIP] 
unzip OLDFILE 
zip NEWFILE * 
// the string to be checked 
// the replacing string 
// the program used to extract tar files 
// the program used to repack tar files 
// the program used to extract zip files 
// the program used to repack tar files 
[GROUPS-NOT-TO-CHECK] 
admin // traffic of users in admin group should not be checked 
staff // traffic of users in staff group should not be checked 
[GROUPS-TO-CHECK] 
student // traffic of users in student group should be checked 
This configuration file example specifies that the firewall should check for the string 
"sex" and replace it with the string It also tells the firewall that tar and zip 
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files should be checked and specifies the external programs used to extract or repack 
such files. In the configuration file, the string OLDFUE denotes the original file to be 
checked and the string NEWFILE denotes the file that has been checked. 
Chapter 10 
Conclusions and Future Works 
By integrating the content filtering with firewall, we provided an alternative solution in 
order to overcome some problems of content filtering at terminal machines. To make 
the filtering more accurate, we proposed and implemented an advanced content 
filtering method based on text categorisation techniques to replace the basic keyword-
matching filtering method. We also discussed using content filtering firewall to protect 
computer virus propagation through the Internet. 
We also found the difficulties that the content filtering firewall encounters when end-
to-end encryption for network traffic is used. We implemented and described an attack 
using encryption to get around the content filtering firewall. 
10.1 Fulfilment of Objectives 
The objectives of this thesis were briefly outlined in Chapter 1. The major 
contributions of this thesis can be summarised as follows. 
• Design and Implementation of a content filtering firewall (in Chapter 4 and 
Chapter 9). 
• Proposal and implementation of an advanced content filtering method based on 
text categorisation techniques (in Chapter 5). 
• Finding the difficulties that the content filtering firewall encounters when end-
to-end encryption for network traffic is in use (in Chapter 8). 
10.2 Future Works 
There still exist many unsolved problems in order to improve the content filtering 
firewall. Such problems include: 
• How to correctly and effectively filter Web pages that consist of both images 
and texts. The method this thesis proposes only utilises texts in the Web pages 
to do filtering. But most Web pages contain not only texts but also images. 
Filtering undesired content based on images will make content filtering more 
complete. 
• How to combine filtering at firewall and filtering at terminal machines. As 
discussed, filtering at firewall and filtering at terminal machines both have their 
advantages and problems. Combining filtering at firewall and filtering at 
terminal machines may help to alleviate these problems. 
• How to deal with encrypted network traffic property. We discussed that 
filtering firewall will fail if the traffic is encrypted (and cannot be decrypted at 
the firewall). The topic of dealing with encrypted traffic at firewall still needs 
further study. 
It is hoped that this thesis can introduce further research on the topic of integrating 
content filtering with firewall. 
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Appendix A 
The Experimental Networic 
The work of this thesis is implemented in a private network with three computers 
running Linux (Red Hat 7.0) operating systems, as shown in Figure 13. Linux is 
chosen because it provides an excellent programming environment, which is essential 
for the thesis's implementation. 
Seclabl 
Users 
192J68,1.1 192.16B.1254 
SedabS 
FirewaU 
192.1682254 192.1682.1 
Sedab? 
Web 
Server 
Internal network 
192.168.1.* 
External network 
192.168.2.* 
Figure 13 Experimental Network Architecture 
The computer SeclabS is the bastion host where the firewall resides and runs. It has 
two network interfaces. One network interface has the IP address 192.168.1.254 and 
connects to the computer Seclabl. The other network interface has the IP address 
192.168.2.254 and connects to the computer SeclabT. Computer Seclabl is used to 
simulate the intemal machine and computer Seclab? is used to simulate the external 
server. Seclabl and Seclab? are not directly connected but they are both connected to 
Seclab5. Therefore, all network traffic between Seclabl and Seclab? must go through 
the firewall Seclab5 first. 
Appendix B 
Testing of the Content Filtering Firewall 
The implementation of content filtering firewall has been tested for both text files and 
non-text files, as shown in Figure 14 and Figure 15. 
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Figure 14 Test for Text Files 
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Connected to 192.168.1.254. 
220"Welcone to the ftp-gw proxy on seclabSt? 
220 
Name (192.168.1.254:poot)- root0192.168.2.1 
531-( GfìTEWfìV CONNECTED TO 192.168.2.1 ) 
331-(220 seclab? FTP seruei^ (Uersion wu-2.6.1(1> Wed Hay 9 
05:54:50 EDT 2001) ready.) 
331 Password required for root. 
Password: 
230 User root logged in. 
Remote system type is UNIX. 
Using binary mode to transfer files. 
ftp> get test.zip 
local: test.zip remote: test.; 
227 Entering Passiue Mode (192,168,1,254,4,23) 
150 Opening BINARV mode data connection for test.zip (815 
bytes). 
226 Trajisfer complete. 
562 bytes receiued in 0.251 sees (2.2 Kbytes/sec) 
ftp> exit 
221"(22l-Vou haue transferred 815 bytes in 1 files.) 
221-(221-Total traffic for this session was 1229 bytes in 
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221-(221-Thank you for using the FTP seruice on seclab?.) 
221 Goodbye. 
[rooteseclabi /root]« unzip test.zip 
Archiue: test.zip 
inflating: test 
[rooteseclabi /root]« cat test 
filename: test 
Created to test content filtering for compressed files. 
The text is: Welcomet? This is a ***** site, 
[rooteseclabi /root]« 
Figure 15 Test for Non-text Files 
It can be observed from Figure 14 and Figure 15 that according to the content filtering 
rules, all the text files and non-text files passing through the firewall have been 
checked and the string "sex" has been replaced by the string 
Appendix C 
Source Codes of the Implementation of the Proposed 
Advanced Content Filtering Method in Chapter 5 
/* 
Author: Rongbo Du 
University of Wollongong, Australia 
Email: rdl2@uow.edu.au 
Purpose: Automatically filters HTML documents 
Version: 3.0 
Date: 2002/010/25 
*/ 
import java.io.*; 
import java.util.*; 
import j avax. swing.text. * ; 
importjava.net.*; 
import org.w3c.dom.*; 
import org.w3c.dom.html.*; 
import com.docuverse.dom.*; 
import com.docuverse.dom.util.*; 
import com.docuverse.dom.html.*; 
public final class AdvancedContentFilteringMethod { 
static Vector training_documents = new VectorQ; 
static Vector traimng_set = new VectorQ; 
static Hashtable alLkeywords = new Hashtable(20000); 
static Hashtable commonwords = new Hashtable(2000); 
static PrintWriter files_statistics; 
static PrintStream result, test_pos, test_neg; 
final static String COMMON_WORDS = "stoplist.txt"; 
public final static String DELMETER = " 0123456789!@#$%-&*()_+h=\V[]{ };':V,./?o"; 
final static int MIN_WORD_FREQUENCY = 2; 
final static int MAX_WORD_FREQUENCY = 20; 
final static int MIN_WORD_LENGTH = 3; 
final static int CONSIDERLAYOUT = 0; 
final static double N_HIGHEST = 0.3; 
final static int USE_TF_IDF = 0; 
static int CONFIDENCE_INTERVAL_RUNS = 100; 
public static double trainingset_threshold = 1; 
static DOM dom = new com.docuverse.dom.DOM0; 
public static void maiii( StringQ args ) { 
if(args.length<4){ 
System.out.priiitlii("traimng positive negative result gui|batch"); 
System.exit(l); 
} 
try{ 
files_statistics = new PrintWriter(new FileOutputStream("files_statistics.txt")); 
result = new PrintStream(new FileOutputStream(args[3])); 
test_pos = new PrintStream(new FileOutputStream("pos.txt")); 
test_neg = new PrintStream(new FileOutputStream("neg.txt")); 
}catch(IOException e){ 
System.out.println("Cannot open files "+args[3]); 
}; 
AdvancedContentFilteringMethod wordcounter = new AdvancedContentFilteringMethodQ; 
wordcounter.loadCommonWordsO; 
dom.setProperty("sax.driver", com.docuverse.html.swing.SAXDriver"); 
dom.setFactory(newcom.docuverse.dom.html.HTMLFactoryO); 
File directory = new File(args[0]); 
if( Idirectory.existsO){ 
System.out.println("Wrong directory!!"); 
System.exit(l); 
} 
FileQ files = directory.listFilesQ; 
for( int i = 0; i < files.length; i-H-) { 
Hashtable keywords = new Hashtable(2000); 
try{ 
BufferedReader in = new BufferedReader(new FileReader(files[i])); 
HTMLDocument doc = (HTMLDocument)dom.readDocument(in); 
if( doc != null) { 
long imtial_words = loadFile(doc, keywords); 
long wordsaflercommonwords = 0, 
wordsaflerlowfrequency = 0; 
Enumeration enum = keywords.elementsQ; 
while( enum.hasMoreElementsO) { 
WordCountStruct w = 
(WordCountStmct) enum.nextElement(); 
wordsaftercoimnonwords += w.getCountQ; 
if( w.getCountO < MIN_WORD_FREQUENCY) 
keywords.remove( w.getWordQ); 
else { 
wordsafterlowfrequency += w.getCount(); 
WordCountStmct temp = 
new WordCountStnict(w); 
temp.updateCount( 0); 
all_keywords.put( temp.getWord(), temp); 
} 
} 
BasicHTMLBodyElement body = 
(BasicHTMLBodyElement) doc.getBodyO; 
if( CONSIDERLAYOUT = 1) 
Webclassifier.considerLayout( doc, 
keywords, common words); 
training_documents.add( keywords); 
} 
in.closeQ; 
}catch(IOException e){ 
System.out.prmtln("Exception in reading files."); 
} 
} 
double precomputed_training_set[] = new double[training_documents.size()]; 
for( int i = 0; i < training_documents.size(); i++ ) { 
Hashtable hash = new Hashtable( alLkeywords ); 
Hashtable temp = (Hashtable) training_documents.get(i); 
//cal_tf_idf( temp, training_documents); 
hash.putAlK temp); 
training_set.add( hash); 
//presentData( (Hashtable) training_set.get(i)); 
//files_statistics.println(" "+files[i]+" "); 
precomputed_training_set[i] = precompute( hash); 
} 
d o u b l e final_sim_testl []=nuU,final_sim_test2[]=null; 
int highest_k = (int)(training_set.size()*N_HIGHEST); 
for( int k = 1; k <= 2; k++ ) { 
File test_directory = new File(args[k]); 
if( !test_directory.exists()){ 
System.out.println("Wrong directory! !");System.exit(l); 
} 
File[] test_files = test_directory.listFiles(); 
double iinal_sim[] = new double[test_files.length]; 
for( int i = 0; i < test_files.length; i++) 
{ 
Hashtable test_doc_key words = new Hashtable(); 
Enumeration el = all_keywords.elements(); 
while( el.hasMoreElementsQ){ 
WordCountStmct w = 
new WordCountStruct( (WordCountStmct) el.nextElement()); 
test_doc_keywords.put( w.getWordQ, w); 
} 
try{ 
BufferedReader in = 
new BufferedReader(new FileReader(test_files[i])); 
HTMLDocument test_doc = 
(HTMLDocument)dom.readDocument(in); 
if( test_doc != null) 
{ 
wordcounter.loadFile( test_doc, test_doc_keywords ); 
Enumeration enum = test_doc_keywords.elements(); 
while( enum.hasMoreElements()) 
{ 
WordCountStmct w = 
(WordCountStmct) enum.nextElement(); 
if( w.getCountO < 
MIN_WORD_FREQUENCY && !all_keywords.containsKey(w.getWord())) 
test_doc_keywords.remove( 
w.getWordO); 
} 
if( CONSIDERLAYOUT = 1) 
Webclassifier.considerLayout( 
test_doc, test_doc_keywords, commonwords); 
double precomputed_value_for_test_doc = 
precompute(test_doc_key words); 
double simi_distance = 0; 
double temp[] = new double[traimng_set.size()]; 
for( int j = 0; j < txaining_set.size(); j++ ) 
{ 
temp[j] = messureDistance( (Hashtable) 
test_doc_keywords, precomputed_value_for_test_doc, (Hashtable) training_set.get(j), precomputed_training_set[j] 
)> 
sum_distance += temp[j]; 
} 
final_sim[i] = get_final_sim( temp, highest_k); 
i f ( k = l ) 
test_pos.prmtln(test_files[i]+","+final_sim[i]); 
else 
test_neg.println(test_files[i]+","+final_sim[i]); 
} 
in.closeO; 
}catch(IOException ioe){ 
System.out.println("Exception in reading test files."); 
} 
} 
Arrays. sort(final_sim); 
i f ( k = = l ) { 
final_sim_testl = new double[final_sim.length]; 
for( int c=0;c<final_sim.length;c++) 
final_sim_testl [c] = final_sim[c]; 
} 
else{ 
final_sim_test2 = new double[fmal_sim.length]; 
for( int c=0;c<final_sim.length;c++) 
final_sim_test2[c] = iinal_sim[c]; 
} 
} 
cal_confidence_interval(); 
result.close(); 
test_pos.close(); 
test_neg.close(); 
iiles_statistics.close(); 
//if( args[4].equals("gui")) 
//gui(wordcounter,dom); 
private static void cal_coiifidence_intervalO { 
double posD = null, neg[] = null; 
try{ 
RandomAccessFile pos_file = new RandoniAccessFile("pos_input.txt", "r"); 
String s=pos_file.readLineO; 
pos = new double[Integer.parseInt(s)]; 
int i = 0; 
while ((s=pos_file.readLineO) != null) { 
pos[i-H-] = Double.parseDouble(s); 
} 
RandomAccessFile neg_file = new RandomAccessFile("neg_input.txt", "r"); 
s=neg_file.readLine(); 
neg = new double[Integer.parseInt(s)]; 
i = 0; 
while ((s=neg_file.readLineO) != null) { 
neg[i-H-] = Double.parseDouble(s); 
} 
} catch (Exception e) {System.out.println("Exception in reading file: "+e); } 
PrintWriter output = null; 
try{ 
output = new PrintWriter(new FileOutputStream("confidence_interval.txt")); 
}catch(IOException e){ 
System.out.println("Cannot open confidencejnterval file!!"); 
}; 
intrun_times[l = { 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, 60, 70,100,150, 200, 300, 500,700,1000,1500,2000 }; 
for( int r = 0; r < run_times.length; r-H-) 
{ 
CONFIDENCE_INTERVAL_RUNS = run_times[r]; 
outpuLprintln( "\t Number of runs: 
"+CONFIDENCE_INTERVAL_RUNS+" "); 
double pos_t = 2.048; // 5% 
double neg_t = 2.045; 115% 
//double pos_t = 2.0025; //10% 
//double neg_t = 2.0017; //10% 
//double pos_t = 1.981; //20% 
//double neg_t = 1.981; //20% 
//double pos_t = 1.974; //30% 
//double neg_t = 1.974; //30% 
double threshold[] = {0.10,0.12,0.14,0.16,0.18,0.20,0.22}; 
int pos_test_size = (int) (pos.length * 0.2)+l; 
int neg_test_size = (int) (neg.length * 0.2)+1; 
int NUM_OF_BLOCKED[][] = new 
int[CONFIDENCE_INTERVAL_RUNS][threshold.length]; 
int NUM_OF_OVERBLOCKED[][] = new 
int[CONFIDENCE_INTERVAL_RUNS] [threshold.length]; 
double pos_test_mean, neg_test_mean; 
int pos_test_sum = 0, neg_test_sum = 0; 
double pos_test[] = new double[pos_test_size]; 
double neg_test[] = new double[neg_test_size]; 
double pos_temp[] = new double[pos.length]; 
double neg_temp[] = new double[neg.length]; 
Random random = new Random(); 
for( int i = 0; i < CONFIDENCE_INTERVAL_RUNS; i++ ){ 
for( int c=0;c<pos.length;c++) 
pos_temp[c] = pos[c]; 
for( int c=0;c<neg.length;c++) 
neg_temp[c] = neg[c]; 
for( int j = 0; j < pos_test_size;){ 
int temp = random.nextInt(pos.length); 
if( pos_temp[temp] != -1){ 
pos_test[j] = pos_temp[temp]; 
pos_temp[temp] = -1; 
j++; 
} 
} 
for( int j = 0; j < neg_test_size;){ 
int temp = random.nextInt(neg.length); 
if( neg_temp[temp] != -1){ 
neg_test[j] =neg_temp[temp]; 
neg_temp[temp] = -1; 
j++; 
} 
} 
Aixays.sortC pos_test); 
Arrays.sort( neg_test); 
for( int t = 0; t < threshold.length; t++ ){ 
NUM_OF_BLOCKED[i][t] = 0; 
NUM_OF_OVERBLOCKED[i][t] = 0; 
for( int j = 0; j < pos_test_size; j++ ){ 
if( pos_test[j] >= threshold[t]){ 
NUM_OF_BLOCKED[i][t] = 
pos_test_size - j; 
break; 
} 
} 
for( int j = 0; j < neg_test_size; j-H-){ 
if( neg_testlj] >= threshold^ ) { 
NUM_OF_OVERBLOCKED[i][t] = 
neg_test_size - j; 
break; 
} 
} 
for( int t = 0; t < threshold.length; t++){ 
pos_test_sum = 0; 
neg_test_sum = 0; 
for( int i = 0; i < CONFIDENCE_INTERVAL_RUNS; i++){ 
pos_test_siim += NUM_OF_BLOCKED[i][t]; 
neg_test_sum += NUM_OF_OVERBLOCKED[i][t]; 
} 
pos_test_mean = (double)(pos_test_sum) *100/ 
(CONFIDENCE_INTERVAL_RUNS*pos_test_size); 
neg_test_mean = (double)(neg_test_smn) *100/ 
(CONFIDENCE_INTERVAL_RUNS*neg_test_size); 
double a = 0, b = 0, temp = 0; 
for(intj = 0; j <CONFIDENCE_INTERVAL_RUNS; j++){ 
temp = ((double)(NUM_OF_BLOCKEDD][t])*100/pos_test_size 
- pos_test_mean); 
a += temp*temp; 
} 
f o r ( i n t j = 0; j <CONFIDENCE_INTERVAL_RUNS; j++){ 
temp 
((double)(NUM_OF_OVERBLOCKEDlj][t])*100/neg_test_size-neg_test_me^^ 
b += temp*temp; 
double sterr_a = pos_t * Math.sqrt(a / 
(CONFroENCE_INTERVAL_RUNS*(CONFroENCE_INTERVAL_RUNS-l))); 
double sterr_b = neg_t * Math.sqrt(b / 
(CONFIDENCE_INTERVAL_RUNS*(CONFIDENCE_INTERVAL_RUNS-l))); 
output.println( (pos_test_meaii - sterr_a)+"\t"+(pos_test_mean + 
sterr_a)+"\t"+(neg_test_mean - steir_b)+"\t"+(neg_test_meaii + sterr_b)+"\t"+threshold[t]); 
result.println(pos_test_mean+'At"+neg_test_mean+"\t"+threshold[t]); 
} 
} 
outputxloseO; 
} 
private static double get_final_sim( double input[], int k ) { 
double temp[] = new double[input.length]; 
for( int i = 0; i < inputJength; i++) 
temp[i] = input[i]; 
double sum_distance = 0; 
for (int i = 0; i < k; i++ ) { 
int max_index = 0; 
for (int j = 0; j < temp.length; j-H-) 
{ 
if( templmaxjndex] < templj]) 
maxjndex = j; 
} 
sum_distance += temp[max_index]; 
temp[max_index] = -1; 
} 
double result = sum_distance / k; 
if (Double.isNaN( result)) 
return 0; 
else 
return result; 
} 
private static void cal_tf_idf( Hashtable hash, Vector training_documents) { 
double L0G_E_2 = Math.log(2); 
int N = traiiiing_documents.size(); 
Enumeration e = hash.elementsQ; 
while( e.hasMoreElementsQ) { 
WordCountStruct w = (WordCountStruct)e.nextElement(); 
if( w.getCountO != 0 ) { 
String word = w.getWordQ; 
int num_of_docs_with_word = 0; 
for (int i = 0; i < training_documents.size(); i++ ) { 
Hashtable temp = (Hashtable) training_documents.get(i); 
WordCountStruct wl = (WordCountStruct) temp.get( word); 
if( wl != null) 
if( wl.getCountQ != 0 ) 
num_of_docs_with_word++; 
L0G_E_2; 
} 
double d = w.getCountQ * Math.log( N*1.0/num_of_docs_with_word ) / 
if( !Double.isInfinite( d ) ) 
w.updateWeight( d); 
} 
} 
private static double precompute( Hashtable hash ) 
{ 
double sum = 0, x; 
Enumeration e = hash.elementsQ; 
while( e.hasMoreElementsQ){ 
if(USE_TF_IDF==l) 
X = ((WordCountStmct)e.nextElement()).getWeightO; 
else 
X = ((WordCountStmct)e.nextElementQ).getCountQ; 
sum += (x * x); 
} 
double result = Math.sqrt( sum); 
if (Double.isNaN( result)) 
return 0; 
else 
return result; 
} 
private static double messureDistance( 
Hashtable test_doc_keywords, double precomputed_value_for_test_doc, 
Hashtable a_training_document, double precomputed_value_for_traimng_doc) 
{ 
i f ( U S E _ T F _ I D F = l ) 
{ 
double suni_xy = 0, sum_y2 = 0, y; 
Enumeration e = test_doc_keywords.elementsO; 
while( e.hasMoreElementsQ) 
{ 
WordCountStruct wl = (WordCountStmct)e.nextElement(); 
WordCountStruct w2 (WordCountStruct)a_training_document.get(wl.getWord()); 
if( w2 != null) 
{ 
y = w2.getWeightO; 
sum_xy += (wl.getWeightQ * y) ; 
sum_y2 += (y * y ) ; 
} 
return sum_xy / (precomputed_value_for_test_doc * Math.sqrt(sum_j2)); 
} 
else 
{ 
long sum_xy = 0, sum_y2 = 0, y; 
Enumeration e = test_doc_keywords.elements(); 
while( e.hasMoreElementsQ) 
{ 
WordCountStruct wl = (WordCountStruct)e.nextElement(); 
WordCountStruct w2 (WordComitStnict)a_training_document.get(wl.getWordO); 
if( w2 != null) 
/ * 
*/ 
{ 
y = w2.getCouiitO; 
siim_xy += (wl.getCountO * y); 
} 
) 
double result = suin_xy / (precoiiiputed_value_for_test_doc * precomputed_value_for_training_doc 
if (Double.isNaN( result)) 
return 0; 
else 
return result; 
} 
Euclidean distance method 
long sum= 0; 
Enumeration el = test_doc_keywords.elementsO; 
while( el.hasMoreElementsO) { 
WordCountStruct wl = (WordCountStruct)el.nextElementO; 
int X = wl.getCountO; 
int y = 0; ^ 
WordCountStruct w2 = (WordCountStruct)a_training_document.get(wl.getWordO); 
if( w2 = null) 
y = 0; 
else 
y = w2.getCountO; 
sum += (x-y) * (x-y); } 
return Math.sqrt( sum); 
} 
private static void loadCommonWords() 
{ 
StringTokenizer token = null; 
BufferedReader buf = null; 
try{ 
buf = new BufferedReader(new FileReader(COMMON_WORDS)); 
} 
catch(FileNotFoundException fhe){ 
System.out.prmtln("Couldn't open " + COMMON.WORDS); 
System.exit(l); 
} 
while(tnie) 
{ 
try{ 
String s = buf.readLineO; 
if( s = null) 
break; 
token = new StringTokenizer(s,DELIMETER); 
} 
catch (lOException e){ 
System.out.println("Error reading from input file."); 
System.exit(l); 
} 
while( token.hasMoreTokensO) { 
String s = new String(token.nextToken()).toLowerCase(); 
WordCountStmct temp = (WordCountStruct) commonwords.get( s ); 
if( temp != null){ 
temp.countPlusPlusO; 
} 
else{ 
WordCountStruct Word = new WordCountStruct(); 
Word.updateCount(l); 
Word.updateWord( s); 
corrmionwords.put( s, Word); 
} 
try{ 
buf.closeO; 
} 
catch(IOException e){ 
System.out.println("Error closing input file."); 
System.exit(l); 
} 
} 
private static long loadFile( HTMLDocument doc , Hashtable hash) 
{ 
BasicHTMLBodyElementbody = (BasicHTMLBodyElement) doc.getBodyO; 
NodeList list = DOMUtil.getNodesByFilter(body,ContentFilter.getDefaultInstanceO); 
TextBuffer buffer = new TextBufferQ; 
for (int i = 0; i < list.getLengthQ; i++) 
{ 
Node node = hstitem(i); 
if (node !=nuU){ 
String parent.name = node.getParentNodeO.getNodeNameQ; 
if( !parent_name.equals("script") && !parent_name.equals("comment")) 
buffer.appendC •+node.getNodeValueO); 
} 
} 
// process meta tag 
list = doc.getElementsByTagNameC'meta"); 
for (int i = 0; i < list.getLengthQ; i++) 
{ 
Node node = list.item(i); 
if (node !=null){ 
NamedNodeMap attribute = node.getAttributesQ; 
if( attribute != null){ 
Node nl = attribute.getNamedItem("name"); 
if(nl !=null){ 
String name = nl.getNodeValueQ; 
if( name != null){ 
if( name.equalsIgnoreCaseC'keywords") 
name.equalsIgnoreCaseC'description")) { 
attribute.getNamedltemC'content"); 
n2.getNodeValue(); 
'+content); 
'+content); 
Node n2 
if(n2 !=null){ 
String content = 
if( content != null){ 
buffer.appendC 
buffer.appendC 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
} 
// process img tag 
/*list = doc.getElementsByTagNameC'img"); 
for (int i = 0; i < list.getLength(); i++) 
{ 
Node node = list.item(i); 
if (node !=null){ 
NamedNodeMap attribute = node.getAttributesQ; 
if( attribute != null){ 
Node nl = attribute.getNamedItem("alt"); 
if( nl != null){ 
String alt = nl.getNodeValueO; 
if( alt != null) 
buffer. appendC '+ alt); 
} 
}*/ 
// process title tag 
buffer.appendC'+ doc.getTide()); 
buffer.appendC'+ doc.getTitle()); 
buffer.appendC'+ doc.getTitle()); 
StringTokenizer token = 
newStringTokenizer(buffer.toString(),DELIMETER); 
long initial_words = 0; 
while( token.hasMoreTokens()) 
{ 
String s = new String(token.nextToken()).toLowerCase(); 
initial_words++; 
if( s.lengthQ < MIN_WORD_LENGTH || commonwords.containsKeyC s ) ) 
continue; // ignore short words and common words 
WordCountStruct temp = (WordCountStruct) hash.get( s ); 
if( temp != null){ 
temp.countPlusPlusO; 
} 
else{ 
WordCountStmct Word = new WordCountStmctQ; 
Word.updateCoiint( 1); 
Word.updateWord( s); 
hash.put( s, Word); 
} 
} 
return initial_words; 
} 
private static void presentData(Hashtable hash) 
{ 
long total_words = 0; 
LinkedList list = new LinkedList(); 
Enumeration enum = hash.elements(); 
while( enum.hasMoreElementsO) 
{ 
WordCountStmct w = 
new WordCountStruct( (WordCountStmct) enum.nextElement()); 
list.add( w); 
} 
Collections.sort( (java.util.List)list, (Comparator)new WordComparator()); 
Listlterator il = list.listIterator( 0); 
while( il.hasNextO) 
{ 
WordCountStmct tmp = (WordCountStmct) il.nextQ; 
total_words += tmp.getCount(); 
} 
Listlterator i = list.listIterator( 0); 
while( i.hasNextO) 
{ 
WordCountStmct tmp = (WordCountStmct) i.nextQ; 
files_statistics.println( 
tmp.toString()+"\t\t"+((float)tmp.getComit()*100/total_words)+"%"); 
} 
} 
public static double siniilarity(String input) { 
double sum_distance = 0; 
Enumeration e = all_keywords.elements(); 
while( e.hasMoreElements()) 
((WordCountStmct) e.nextElement()).updateCount( 0); 
Hashtable test_doc_key words = new Hashtable(all_key words); 
try{ 
URL url = new URL(input); 
URLConnection conn = url.openConnectionQ; 
if( input.indexOf("uow.edu.au") = -1) // not local web site { 
String authentication = "Basic " + new 
sun.misc.BASE64Encoder().encode("rdl2:type your password here".getBytes()); 
System.getProperties0.put("proxySet", "true"); 
System.getProperties().put("proxyHost", "proxy.uow.edu.au"); 
System.getProperties().put("proxyPort", "8080"); 
corm.setRequestProperty("Proxy-Authorization", authentication); 
} 
HTMLDocument test_doc = 
(HTMLDocument)dom.readDocument(conn. getlnputStreamQ); 
if( test_doc != null) { 
loadFile( test_doc, test_doc_keywords); 
Enumeration enum = test_doc_keywords.elements(); 
while( enum.hasMoreElements()) { 
WordCountStmct w = new WordCountStmct( (WordCountStmct) 
enum.nextElement()); 
if( w.getCountO < MIN_WORD_FREQUENCY && 
!alLkeywords.containsKey(w.getWord())) 
// remove low frequency words 
test_doc_keywords.remove( w.getWordQ); 
} 
if( CONSIDERLAYOUT = 1 ) 
Webclassifier.considerLayoutC test_doc, test_doc_keywords, 
commonwords); 
double precomputed_value_for_test_doc = 
precompute(test_doc_key words); 
for( int j = 0; j < training_set.sizeO; j++) { 
sum_distance += 
messureDistance( (Hashtable) test_doc_keywords, 
precomputed_value_for_test_doc, (Hashtable) traiiiing_set.get(j), 0); 
} 
} 
}catch(Exception el){ 
System.out.println("Exception removing HTTP header"); 
Sy stem.out.println(e 1); 
} 
return sum_distance / training_set.size(); 
} 
private static void gui( AdvancedContentFilteringMethod filter,DOM dom) 
{ 
Gui app = new Gui(filter); 
} 
} 
final class WordCountStruct{ 
private String word; 
private int count; 
private double weight; 
WordCountStruct (WordCountStruct another){ 
word = new String( another.word); 
count = another.count; 
weight = another, weight; 
} 
WordCountStruct (){ 
word = null; 
count = 0; 
weight = 0; 
} 
public void countPlusPlusO{ 
count++; 
} 
public void updateWeight( double n){ 
weight = n; 
} 
public void updateCouiit( int n ){ 
count = n; 
} 
public double getWeight( ){ 
return weight; 
} 
public int getCount( ){ 
return count; 
} 
public void updateWord( String newword ){ 
word = new String( newword ); 
) 
public String getWord( ){ 
return word; 
} 
public String toStringC ){ 
if( word.length() <= 8 ) 
return new String(word+"\t\t\t"+count+"\t"+weight); 
else 
return new String(word+"\t\t"+count+"\t"+weight); 
} 
} 
final class WordComparator implements Comparator 
{ 
public int compare( Object objl, Object obj2 ) 
{ 
WordCountStruct a = (WordCountStmct) objl; 
WordCountStruct b = (WordCountStmct) obj2; 
int a_count = a.getCount(); 
int b_count = b.getCount(); 
if( a_count > b_count ) 
return 1; 
else if( a_count < b_count ) 
return -1; 
else 
return a.getWord().compareTo( b.getWordQ ); 
} 
} 
Appendix D 
Source Codes of the Implementation of the Proposed Attack 
on Content Filtering Firewall in Chapter 8 
The implementation of the proposed attack on content filtering firewall is a Java applet 
written using Java API for XML Processing (JAXP) from Sun Microsystems, Inc. 
/ * 
Author: Rongbo Du 
University of Wollongong, Australia 
Email: rdl2@uow.edu.au 
Purpose: Using Java API for XML Parsing to develop a Java 
applet that can decrypt and display the ciphertext inside 
XML files. 
Version: 3.0 
Date: 2001/04/30 
*/ 
import javax.xml.parsers.DocumentBuilder; 
import javax.xml.parsers.DocumentBuilderFactory; 
import javax.xml.parsers.FactoryConfigurationError; 
import javax.xml.parsers.ParserConfigurationException; 
import org.xml.sax.SAXException; 
import org.xml.sax.SAXParseException; 
import java.io.File; 
import java.io.IOException; 
import org.w3c.dom.Document; 
import org.w3c.dom.DOMException; 
import javax. swing. JFrame; 
import javax.swing.JPanel; 
import javax.swing.JScrollPane; 
import j avax. swing. JTree; 
import j avax. swing. JSplitPane; 
import javax.swing.JEditorPane; 
import javax.swing.border.EmptyBorder; 
import javax.swing.border.BevelBorder; 
import javax.swing.border.CompoundBorder; 
import j avax. swing, tree. *; 
import javax.swing.event. *; 
import java.awt.BorderLayout; 
import java.awt.Dimension; 
iiiq)ort java.awt.Toolkit; 
import java.awt.event.WindowEvent; 
mport java.awt.event.WindowAdapter; 
import java.util.*; 
import Java.awt.*; 
mport javax.swing.*; 
miport java.awt.event.*; 
mportjava.net.*; 
import java.io.*; 
import java.applet.*; 
public class xmlApplet extends Applet { 
private DocmnentBuilderFactory factory; 
static Docmnent docmnent; 
final String firstPage = "ciphertextxml"; 
public void initO { 
super.initO; 
setBackground( new Color( 221, 221, 255)); 
factory = DocumentBuilderFactory.newInstanceQ; 
getThePage( firstPage); 
} 
private void getThePage( String location) { 
if( location.endsWith( ".xml")) { 
org.w3c.dom.NodeList list; 
org.w3c.dom.Node node; 
try { 
DocumentBuilder builder = factory.newDocumentBuilderQ; 
document = builder.parse( location ); 
} catch (SAXException sxe){ 
Exception x = sxe; 
if (sxe.getExceptionO != null) 
X = sxe.getExceptionO; 
x.printStackTraceQ; 
} catch (ParserConfigurationException pce){ 
pce.printStackTraceQ; 
} catch (lOException ioe){ 
ioe.printStackTraceO; 
} 
list = document.getElementsByTagName("encryt_method"); 
node = list.item(0); 
String encryt_method = node.getFirstChild().getNodeValue(); 
list = document.getElementsByTagNameC'key"); 
node = list.item(0); 
int key = Integer.parselnt( node.getFirstChild().getNodeValue()); 
list = document.getElementsByTagName("ciphertext"); 
node = list.item(0); 
String ciphertext = node.getFirstChild().getNodeValue(); 
String output = "Since this is an xml file with ciphertext in it, the program will decrypt the 
ciphertext then display the corresponding plaintext! !\n\n\n"; 
String plaintext =""; 
if( encryt_method.equals( "Additive ciphers")) { 
for( int i = 0; i < ciphertext.lengthQ; i++) 
plaintext += (char)(((int)ciphertext.charAt(i))+key); 
output += "\tThe plaintext is: "+plaintext+"\n"; 
output += "\tThe encrypt method is: "+encryt_method+"\n"; 
output += "\tThe key is: "+key+"\n"; 
} 
else { 
output += "\n\n\tEncryption method not supported! !\n\n"; 
} 
output += 
"XML file processed by JAVA browser developped by Rongbo Du."; 
} 
} 
} 
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